Joint Publication 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

15 September 2004

Revision First Draft

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles ~~and doctrine~~ that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint ~~and multinational operations~~operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational ~~and interagency~~ operations and interagency coordination. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

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CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

"The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology . . . occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power."

President George W. Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

1. Security Environment

a. Today's security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats constantly appearing and disappearing from the scene. Some threats possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), advanced missile technology, or are willing to conduct terrorism, cyber attacks, and/or drug trafficking to achieve strategic objectives. Urban and other difficult terrain and cyberspace are increasingly becoming part of the battlespace. The battlespace often contains humanitarian crisis conditions requiring population management and/or support and control. In addition to military capabilities and noncombatants, there are a large number of governmental, nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations in the battlespace; each with their own, sometimes supporting, but sometimes competing, agendas. Many of these organizations are increasing in power and influence to such an extent that they will be able to exert significant pressure on military and political leadership.[1]

b. Political and military leaders have to account for a much broader battlespace that extends well beyond a single region of conflict. The battlespace is increasingly global, encompassing land, sea, air, space, and cyber dimensions. This increasing scope of the battlespace may not necessarily result from actions by the confronted adversary alone, but is likely to result from other adversaries exploiting opportunities as a consequence of an over-extended or distracted United States or coalition. These other powers encompass a variety of actors from transnational organizations to states or even ad-hoc state coalitions.[2]

c. The American homeland and other US interests will be targeted for direct and indirect attack. Adversary attacks oriented on political and public targets will become essential in confronting any US military operation. Lines of communication (LOCs), force projection platforms, access points, staging areas, and regional allies and friends will all be critical points of adversary focus for disruption and destruction.[3]

d. The importance of rapidly expanding global and regional information architectures, systems, and organizations, both private and public, cannot be overstated. Advances in technology are likely to continue to increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Vulnerabilities also will arise out of technological advances.[4]

e. Displacement and migration of people will expand existing cultural and demographic factors well beyond the limits of state or regional borders. This will have a tendency to expand local conflicts and increase the difficulties of conflict resolution. In many regions, "demographic time bombs" will explode as other factors generate instability or conflict. In such cases, correction of the immediate conflict causal factors may not return the area to a state of stability.[5]

f. Within this security environment, maintaining national security and striving for worldwide stability will be a complicated, continuous process. It will require well-planned joint campaigns and operations that account for numerous potential changes in the nature of an operation and seamless transitions between major combat and stability operations.[6]

2. Strategic Guidance and Considerations

a. **National Strategic Direction**. The President and Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure the following.

(1) **The national strategic objectives (i.e., the desired end state) and termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable**.

(2) Active Service forces are ready for combat and Reserve Component (RC) forces are appropriately mobilized and readied to join active forces.

(3) Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational environment and area.

(4) Strategic direction is current and timely.

(5) Defense and other government agencies (OGAs) support the employment of forces by joint force commanders (JFCs).

(6) All required continental United States (CONUS)-based assets and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.

(7) Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.

(8) Forces and sustainment deploy into the operational area ready to support the JFC's concept of operations.[7]

b. **Policy and Planning Documents**. National security strategy (NSS) and national military strategy (NMS), shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders (CCDRs). These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). Further, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides CCDRs with specific planning guidance for preparation of their theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs) and operation plans. Figure I-1 illustrates the relationship between the various strategic guidance sources described below.[8]

Figure I-1. National Strategic Guidance

(1) **National Security Strategy**. The United States bases its security strategy on American values and interests and its aim is to make the world both safer and better. Its goals are political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The NSS includes strengthening alliances and working with others to defeat global terrorism and defuse regional conflicts; preventing our enemies from threatening the United States, its Allies, and friends with WMD; and transforming America's national security institutions.[9]

(2) The **NMS** supports the aim and goals of the NSS. It describes the ways and means to **protect** the United States, **prevent** conflict and surprise attack, and **prevail** against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. NMS and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The **NMS** provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CCDRs, to the President, the National

Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives.[10]

(3) The **JSCP** provides guidance for planning purposes to the CCDRs and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions using current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten US national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and Secretary of Defense.[11]

(4) The **TSCP** is a strategic planning document intended to link a CCDR's regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. The TSCP is based on planning guidance provided in the JSCP. The TSCP identifies the prioritization and integration and synchronization of peacetime military engagement activities on a regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from geographic combatant command engagement activities that support national strategic objectives. For planning purposes, combatant command TSCP planners use assigned forces, those rotationally deployed to the theater, and those forces that historically have been deployed for engagement activities. Each geographic CCDR's TSCP is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and integration into the global family of engagement plans.[12]

For additional guidance on theater security cooperation planning, refer to CJCS Manual 3113.01A, Theater Security Cooperation Planning.

c. **Global Strategy**

(1) The Secretary of Defense, with assistance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines where the US military should be focused and where the nation can afford to accept risk. Because resources are always finite, hard choices must be made that take into account the competing priorities of the combatant commands. Continually assessing the relative importance of the various theater operations remains imperative.

Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance between the Joint Staff and the CCDRs ensures that changing strategic priorities are appropriately translated into clear priorities in providing forces and capabilities to CCDRs.[13]

(2) The combined effect of all combatant command actions can defeat an adversary with global reach through strategies that include:

(a) Direct and continuous military action coordinated with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power within their geographic areas.

(b) Attacking the threat before it reaches US borders in concert with the international partners.

(c) Preemptively attacking the enemy, preventing them from harming US interests.

(d) Denying future sponsorship, support, or sanctuary through cooperation or by convincing states to engage their international responsibilities.[14]

d. **Role of the Combatant Commanders**

(1) Geographic CCDRs have responsibility for a geographic area of responsibility (AOR) assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense. Functional CCDRs support (or can be supported by) geographic CCDRs or may conduct operations in direct support of the President and Secretary of Defense. CCDRs are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands and for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them.[15] Based on guidance and direction from the President and Secretary of Defense, CCDRs prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. Supporting CCDRs and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander's strategy.[16] General responsibilities for CCDRs are established

by law (title 10, United States Code (USC), section 164) and expressed in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.[17]

(2) CCDRs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations. Directives flow from the President and Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the CCDRs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.[18] However, successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired end state. Military operations must be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals.[19] Consequently, CCDRs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military forces in conjunction with interagency organizations and multinational forces.[20]

(3) Using their strategic estimate(s), CCDRs develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans. These strategies translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. CCDRs' plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE); establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans.[21]

e. **Role of the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)**. The Services, in addition to USSOCOM and under additional authority established in title 10, USC, section 167, organize, mobilize, train, and equip Active and Reserve Component forces, military retirees, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and selected host-nation (HN) personnel. The Active and Reserve Components are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy.[22] **Spontaneous, unpredictable crises** call for trained and ready forces that are either forward deployed or are rapidly and globally deployable from CONUS. These forces should be initially self-sufficient and

must possess the credible combat capabilities needed to effectively act in the US national interest or signal US resolve prior to conflict. Such forces are usually drawn from the **active force structure** and normally are tailored and integrated into joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and USSOCOM. RC forces provide the Nation with unique and complementary capabilities in time of war or national emergencies. **RC individuals or forces** often are required to facilitate the deployment of forces or provide capabilities that are necessary for a robust, versatile joint force.[23]

3. Range of Military Operations

a. The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of our national security goals in a variety of operations ranging in size and intensity. These generally are grouped in three categories: **DOD's contributions to homeland security (HS)**, **stability operations**, and **major combat operations (MCO)**. The nature of the security environment is such that the US military often will be engaged in several simultaneous joint operations.

b. **DOD's Contributions to Homeland Security**. The Department of Defense supports HS through two distinct but interrelated mission areas—**homeland defense (HD)** and **civil support (CS)**.

(1) **Homeland Defense**. **HD is the protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and defense critical infrastructure, against external threats and aggression**. HD consists of air defense, land defense, and maritime defense. The Department of Defense is the lead Federal Agency (LFA) for HD. Although the focus is protection of the US homeland, HD missions can include preemptive activities to deter, disrupt, and destroy adversary capabilities at their source. Thus, HS involves worldwide defensive and offensive actions.

(2) **Civil Support**. The broad mission of **military assistance to civil authorities (MACA)** encompasses **employment of military forces within the United**

States, its territories, and possessions and is provided under the auspices of CS. Some MACA operations can be continuing in nature, but the purpose of many is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time until civil authorities can operate effectively without military assistance. An example is **Joint Task Force (JTF) ANDREW**, which was formed when the Governor of Florida asked for Federal assistance after Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida on 24 August 1992. MACA operations and enabling activities include, but are not limited to, **domestic crisis management** and **consequence management (CM)**, **counterdrug operations**, **maritime security**, **disaster response**, and **border security**.

c. **Stability Operations**. Operations in this category encompass a wide range of activities **where the military instrument of national power is used outside the United States and its territories for purposes other than the MCO typically associated with war**. The goal of stability operations is to maintain or re-establish order and promote normalcy. They consist of global and regional military operations that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations. They often are of small scale and limited duration but can require combat operations and may involve the risk of escalation. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. For example, US European Command established **JTF SHINING HOPE** in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief as Serbian aggression caused hundreds of thousands of Albanians to flee their homes in Kosovo. Stability operations help ensure unhindered access by the United States and its allies to a global economy. Many of these operations involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities; and cooperation with OGAs, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Examples of stability operations include, but are not limited to, **arms control**, **enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations**, **ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight**, **foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)**, **foreign internal defense**, **noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)**, **peace operations (PO)**, **strikes and raids**, **recovery operations**, and **support**

to insurgency and counterinsurgency.

d. **Major Combat Operations.** When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the **US national leadership may decide to conduct MCO**, **placing the United States in a wartime state**. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States and its multinational partners. Such operations typically are characterized by a joint campaign comprised of multiple phases. Examples include US Central Command's operations against Iraq in Operations **DESERT SHIELD** and **DESERT STORM** (1990-1991) and more recently against the same adversary in Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)** (2004).

e. **Figure I-2** reflects the range of military operations and the categories described above, together with general military objectives and historical examples. The President, Secretary of Defense, and CCDRs employ joint capabilities in operations throughout this range. Prudent use of these capabilities in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Many of the missions associated with CS and stability operations, such as disaster relief and FHA, will not require combat. But others, such as Operation **RESTORE HOPE** in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and require a significant effort to protect US forces while accomplishing the mission. **Thus, operational protection is a pervasive requirement in any joint operation.** Individual operations often contribute to a larger, long-term effort. For example, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Figure I-2 encompasses protective measures that are part of HD as well as MCO such as Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM**.



Figure I-2. Range of Military Operations

e. **Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations**

(1) **Simultaneous joint operations with different end states can be conducted within a geographic CCDR's AOR**. MCO can be initiated while stability operations are ongoing in the same or another part of the theater (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) during the enforcement of United Nations sanctions on IRAQ). Further, stability operations may be initiated separately or as part of a campaign or major operation (e.g., the 1991 NEO in Somalia during Operation DESERT SHIELD). In the extreme, separate MCO within a theater may be initiated/ongoing while a global campaign is being waged (e.g., Operations OEF and OIF during the GWOT). Consequently, **geographic CCDRs should pay particular attention to synchronizing and integrating the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting forces through subordinate and supporting JFCs toward a common purpose** that supports attaining national, theater, and/or multinational strategic objectives. Additionally, **CCDRs and**

subordinate JFCs work with US Ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.[24]

(2) **Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose**. Disaster relief operations, for example, are military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike or raid — such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 joint operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism — is an example of a military operation for a specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence. **Often**, however, **military operations will have multiple purposes as dictated by a fluid and changing situation**. Branch and sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force. During the 1992-1993 operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE), peace enforcement operations evolved from original humanitarian assistance efforts, challenging the command with multiple missions. Joint forces must strive to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.

f. **Global Nature of Some Operations**. US joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats and influencing potential adversaries with a variety of capabilities. However, global reach and influence is not just the purview of nation states. Globalization and emerging technologies allows small groups to conduct tribal warfare on a global scale with relative ease and at little cost. Adversaries are placing greater emphasis on developing capabilities to threaten the United States directly and indirectly with their own strategic capabilities. Increased interdependence of national economies and rapid movement of information around the world causes significant challenges in the defense of the nation's interest. Identifying potential threats (nations and non-state actors) operating independently or in loose coalitions, determining their intent, and determining the best course of action (COA) to counter their actions is an interagency and multinational challenge for the United States. The elusive nature of adversaries and the ever increasing speed of the media and communications globally demands greater flexibility and effectiveness from US joint forces particularly communications and

intelligence resources. Consequently, the US military conducts some operations on a global, not theater, scale (i.e., information operations [IO] and special operations [SO] in the GWOT) as part of the nation's security strategy to prevent direct or indirect attacks on the US homeland and other national interests.[25]

4. Termination of Operations

a. **General**. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are part of **operational art** and are discussed in Chapter III, "Operational Design." Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that **termination of operations is an essential link between NSS, NMS, and the desired end state**. Further, military operations normally are not terminated at the conclusion of sustained combat operations — stability operations (that may include combat) to facilitate the transition to peace and normalcy will be required to achieve the desired end state.

b. **Political Considerations**. There are two general means for obtaining national strategic objectives by force. The first seeks domination of the opponent's military strength or overthrow of the opponent's political regime — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and sets the stage for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation or group to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. A nation or group needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

(1) Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the adversary. Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the adversary considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

(2) The issue of termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the adversary's strategic objective shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. **Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as operations move toward advantageous termination**.

c. **Military Considerations**

(1) In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the desired end state and associated termination criteria. Termination criteria will differ significantly for a negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the criteria. Implementing military commanders should request clarification of the desired end state and termination criteria from higher authority when required.

Coalition commanders communicate war termination to Iraqi military leadership during Operation DESERT STORM.

(2) An essential consideration is the military role in the follow-on **political exploitation** of completed sustained combat operations during **the transition to peace and normalcy**. This exploitation may include PO, civil-military operations (CMO), IO, and FHA. These operations **require detailed planning, liaison, and coordination** both at the national level and in the theater among diplomatic, military, and civilian leadership.

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CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

"As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare."

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. The Principles

a. **Foundation Principles**. **Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience**. Its **foundation** includes the bedrock principles of war and the associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in Chapter III, "United States Military Power," of JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. It seeks to provide JFCs with basic guidance to defeat an adversary. It is a doctrine that recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of unified action, and the synchronization and integration of military operations in time, space, and purpose. Further, its **primary principle** for employment of US joint forces is to **take decisive action to ensure achievement of the national strategic objectives established by the President and Secretary of Defense while concluding operations in the shortest time possible and on terms favorable to the United States**.

b. **Principals of Joint Operations**. Joint operations doctrine also is dynamic. Although the historical nine principles of war have been consistent in joint doctrine since its inception, extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations has identified three additional principles that apply to all current and future joint operations. Together, they comprise the **12 principles of joint operations** listed in Figure II-1 and discussed in Appendix A.

Figure II-1. Principles of Joint Operations

2. The Levels of War

a. **General**. The three levels of war — **strategic, operational, and tactical** — help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. There are no finite limits or boundaries between them. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types and location of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies. Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate

resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.

b. **The Strategic Level**. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. The President and Secretary of Defense translate policy into national strategic objectives. These objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. CCDRs usually participate in strategic discussions with the President and Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The combatant command strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Military strategy, derived from policy, provides a framework for conducting operations.

c. **The Operational Level**. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design of operations using operational art — the employment of military forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the adversary disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.[26]

d. **The Tactical Level**. Tactics are the employment of units in combat. They include the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the adversary to use their full potential. An engagement normally is short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, in

space, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

3. Unified Action

a. **General**. Whereas the term "joint operations" is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the term "unified action" has a broader connotation. **The concept of unified action** is illustrated in Figure II-2 and **highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power** and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.



Figure II-2. Unified Action

b. **The JFC's Role**. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying actions (all of the elements and actions that comprise unified actions normally are present at the CCDR's level). However, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. All JFCs are responsible for unified actions that are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the

President and Secretary of Defense, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior commanders).

(1) **JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities** to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and operations. Accordingly, JFCs must be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both Active and Reserve Component forces, blending them in such a manner as to maximize the overall capability of the joint force.[27] JFCs also should ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations (OGAs such as the Agency for International Development, NGOs, international organizations, and the United Nations [UN]). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders.

(2) **Unified action** often is complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and nonmilitary participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. **This requires that the JFC rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort**. JFCs also may support a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian organization. For example, in some FHA operations, the United States Agency for International Development, through its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, may be designated as the lead LFA with the CCDR in a supporting role. Under such circumstances, commanders must establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort. Further, it is important that all levels of command understand the informal and formal military-civilian relationships to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.[28]

c. **Multinational Participation**

(1) **General**. Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations[29] within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, US forces often will be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.[30] UN resolutions also may provide the basis for use of a multinational military force.[31] The uneven capabilities of allies and coalition partners complicates the integration of multinational partners and the coordination and synchronization of their activities during multinational operations.[32] Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements (i.e., other members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party). US forces still remain bound by US treaty obligations, even if the other members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its terms.[33]

(2) **Key Considerations**

(a) **National Goals**. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation can therefore produce differing perceptions of progress. JFCs should strive to understand each nation's goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. Maintaining

cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.[34]

(b) **Cultural and Language Differences**. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religion, and economic and social outlooks. Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Information lost during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects. To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. Linguists must be capable of communicating warfighting concepts between military forces of diverse cultures.[35]

(c) **Command and Control (C2) of US Forces**. **By US policy, the President retains command authority over US forces**. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. Where senior JFCs are in the chain of command between the deployed JFC and the President and Secretary of Defense, provisions should be made for bypassing intermediate points in the chain of command for exceptional and emergency situations. Further, it is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action) to place appropriate US forces under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders' authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is required.[36]

(d) **C2 Structures**

1. **Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures**. Allied forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the allied force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands often are led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances.[37]

2. **Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead nation C2 structure or a combination of the two**.

a. **Parallel command** exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often is the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces.[38]

b. **Lead Nation Command**. In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership[39]

c. **Combination**. **Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously** within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national

forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.[40]

(e) **Liaison**. Regardless of the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant liaison structure to develop and maintain unity of effort. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation through, among other things, liaisons. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well.[41] Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding.[42] Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national special operations forces (SOF) units or naval forces. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible. Liaison officers serving with multinational partners should be operationally proficient, innovative, tenacious, and diplomatic; with the authority to speak for their parent commander.[43] Desired capabilities of LNOs include:

1. Trained to understand US disclosure policy.

2. Able to speak the language of the command assigned.

3. Authority to speak for the JFC or other parent commander.

4. Secure communications with JFC.

5. Familiar with the combat identification (CID) capability of both parties.

The senior JFC LNO will coordinate activities of component command LNOs assigned to the same multinational partner's headquarters.[44]

(f) **Information Sharing**. An inability to share valuable information not only destroys trust and confidence, but also is antithetical to effective integration of the complex interactions required to succeed in wartime. As the Department of Defense moves toward a net-centric environment, it faces new challenges to the timely, efficient, and effective sharing of information required to integrate participating multinational partners. An effective information-sharing environment must support multilateral or bilateral information exchanges between the multinational staff and forces, as well as the military staffs and governments for each participating nation.[45] Actions to improve the ability to share information need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances).[46] JFCs, in accordance with national directives, need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. The limits of intelligence sharing and the procedures for doing so should be included in agreements with multinational partners that are concluded after obtaining proper negotiating authority. Any such agreements should incorporate limitations imposed by US law and/or the US **National Disclosure Policy**; which promulgates specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, facilitates CID, and is perishable.[47]

(g) **Logistics**. Multinational logistics is a major challenge. Potential problem areas include differences in logistic doctrine, stockage levels, logistic mobility, interoperability, infrastructure, competition between Services and alliance and/or coalition members for common support, and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. **The notion that logistics are primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in**

the operational area. JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations. Standardization of logistic systems and procedures can ease the logistic challenges. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and is considered by operational planners during concept development. [48]The **acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA)** is a tool for mutual exchange of logistic support and services. ACSA is a reimbursable, bilateral support program that allows reimbursable logistics-exchanges between US and foreign military forces. ACSA provide the necessary legal authority to allow mutual logistic support between the US and multinational partners. This agreement increases flexibility for operational commanders by allowing fast response when logistic support or services are requested.[49]

For further guidance on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

Operation SUPPORT HOPE joint task force officers explain airlift control element operations at Entebbe Airport to the President of Uganda. A JTF, assembled in Entebbe, coordinated Ugandan support to the United Nations humanitarian relief effort to Rwanda.[50]

(h) There are numerous other important multinational considerations relating to mission assignments, organization of the operational area, intelligence, planning, ROE, doctrine and procedures, and public affairs (PA). Expanded discussions

on these and the previously discussed considerations are provided in JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.

d. **Interagency Coordination**

(1) **General**. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with OGAs; foreign governments, NGOs, and international organizations in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Other agencies may be the lead effort during some operations with the Department of Defense providing support, however, US military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies.[51] In some cases, a LFA is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.[52]

(2) Complex operations, such as PO, may require a high order of civil-military integration. Presidential directives (such as Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*) guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unified action; which is made more difficult by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques.[53] **Such agencies and organizations often operate employing "management," "direction," or "coordination" rather than "command**." In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unity of effort.[54] Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.[55]

(3) **Formal Agreements**. The interagency environment does not preclude establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian agencies of government. In some instances, military and nongovernmental or international organizations may establish short-term agreements. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of

understanding or terms of reference. Heads of agencies or organizations and authorized military commanders negotiate and co-sign plans.[56]

(4) **Information Sharing**. Unified action requires effective information sharing between the Department of Defense, OGAs, and state and local agencies. Accordingly, JFCs should develop habitual relationships, procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies. For example, DOD support to HS requires detailed coordination and information sharing with the Department of Homeland Security.[57]

(5) **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)**. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government (USG) civilian and military experts made available to the CCDR, the JIACG provides the command with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other civilian departments and agencies. There is no established structure for the JIACG. Its size and composition depends on the operational requirements. The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national strategic level through the National Security Council System. JIACG members participate in deliberate, crisis, and theater security cooperation and transition planning and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.[58]

(6) **Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)**. One method to build unity of effort and conduct on-site interagency coordination is to establish a CMOC. There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces, OGAs, multinational partners, HN organizations (if outside the United States), international organizations, and NGOs. Civil affairs (CA) teams may be used to establish the CMOC core. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of international organizations and NGOs and how they influence mission accomplishment.[59]

For additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.[60]

4. Command and Control

a. **Command** includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the current state of friendly and adversary forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state.

(1) **Command Authorities**. JFCs exercise an array of command authorities (i.e., combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), OPCON, TACON, and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces. These authorities also are referred to as command relationships. Their definitions are provided in the glossary and the specific authorities associated with each command relationship summarized in Figure II-3 are outlined in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).* Unity of command in joint operations is enhanced through the application of the various command relationships as follows.[61]

(a) **COCOM** is exercised only by combatant commanders and over assigned or reassigned forces. COCOM may be exercised through the commanders of subordinate unified commands, JTFs, Service components, functional components, single-Service forces, and SOF. COCOM includes the authority to **exercise directive authority for logistics** and to delegate directive authority for a common support capability to a subordinate JFC. Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the exercise of logistic authority enables the use of all facilities and supplies of all assigned and/or attached forces. Under peacetime conditions, logistic authority will be exercised consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary

considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Figure II-3. Command Relationships

(b) **OPCON** is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated to and exercised by subordinate JFCs and joint force component commanders over attached forces. The exercise of OPCON involves organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON in and of itself does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic JOAs of subordinate JFCs.

(c) **TACON** may be delegated to commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and exercised over assigned or attached forces or military capabilities or forces made available for tasking. **TACON typically is exercised by functional component commanders over military capabilities or forces made**

available (i.e., those not assigned or attached) for tasking. It is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

(d) **Support**. Establishing support relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Within a joint force, more than one supported command may be designated simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support in different mission areas, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force special operations component may be supported simultaneously for a direct action mission while providing support to a joint force land component for a deep operation. Similarly, a joint force maritime component may be supported simultaneously for sea control while supporting a joint force air component to achieve air superiority over the operational area.[62]

1. **Support relationships can be established among all functional and Service component commanders**, such as the coordination of operations in depth involving the joint force land component commander and the JFACC. The JFC's needs for unity of command and unity of effort dictate these relationships. Within a theater and/or JOA, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective.[63]

a. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs with theater- and/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA, including within the land and naval force commanders' AOs.[64]

b. In coordination with the land and/or naval force commander, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations and attack targets

within land and naval AOs. If those operations would have adverse impact within a land or naval AO, the commander must either readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.[65]

2. **Whether they are Service or functional component commanders, land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders within their AOs designated by the JFC**. Within their designated AOs, land and naval force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs. **Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders also may be the supporting commander for some functions**.[66]

USCENTCOM – USEUCOM COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

In December 2002 USCENTCOM and USEUCOM met in Stuttgart, Germany to discuss Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The two broad issues were organizing the operational area and coordinating the command relationships for all OIF phases.

The USCENTCOM OIF theater of operations would by necessity cross the UCP designated USCENTCOM and USEUCOM AORs boundary. Specifically, the land and airspace of Turkey was recognized for its potential to contribute to opening a northern line of operation. Discussions over the potential options for organizing the OIF operational area led to an agreement to not request a temporary change in the UCP modifying the AORs, but to rely on the establishment of appropriate command relationships between the two combatant commanders.

Discussions over the potential C2 options led to the decision to establish a support relationship between USCENTCOM (supported) and USEUCOM (supporting). This relationship was codified by the Secretary of Defense. It enabled the development of coherent and supporting campaign plans.

In the campaign design and plan, USEUCOM retained TACON for the coordination and execution of operational movement (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration), ISR, logistics and personnel support, and protection in support of USCENTCOM forces transiting the USEUCOM AOR; specifically Turkey. Once USCENTCOM-allocated joint forces were positioned and prepared to cross the Turkish – Iraqi Border (to commence offensive operations) OPCON would be delegated to USCENTCOM. Throughout the operation, USEUCOM would exercise TACON of all USCENTCOM-allocated forces transiting the USEUCOM AOR (into Turkey). For OIF Phase III and Phase IV operations, USCENTCOM would exercise OPCON over any USEUCOM forces entering Iraq.

Maintaining UCP AOR boundaries and the establishment of an umbrella support relationship between the combatant commanders with conditional command authorities exercised over the participating forces based on their readiness and operation phase

provided a workable solution to the integration and employment of joint forces on the seam of two AORs.

Various Sources[67]

(2) **Other Authorities** granted to commanders, and in some cases subordinates, include **administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized**. The definitions for each authority are provided in the glossary and the specific authorities associated with each are outlined in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).*

(3) JFCs exercise command and influence the outcome of joint campaigns and operations by performing the following.

(a) Delegating command authority and establishing support relationships.

(b) Assigning missions.

(c) Defining the commander's intent.

(d) Designating the priority effort(s).

(e) Prioritizing and allocating resources.

(f) Assessing risks to be taken.

(g) Deciding when and how to redirect efforts.

(h) Committing reserves.

(i) Staying attuned to the needs of subordinates and seniors.

(j) Guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.

b. **Control** is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander's intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area.[68] Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

c. **C2 System**. JFCs exercise authority and direction through a C2 system which consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential for planning, directing, assessing, and controlling operations. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the JFC's ability to adjust plans for future operations, while focusing on current operations. The **joint force staff** works within the JFC's intent to assist in the direction and control of forces assigned, attached, or provided to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting adversary or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the JFC accordingly.

(1) The related **tools** for implementing command decisions include the battlespace communications system (BCS) and inputs from ISR systems. Space-based systems provide commanders with critical support in communications, navigation, ISR, ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly improves the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally, thereby enhancing the situational awareness of commanders at all levels.

(2) **Liaison** is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander

to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander's intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters and should be assigned early in the planning stage of joint operations.

(3) **Control and Coordination Measures**. JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control, airspace control, and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include, but are not limited to, boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields.[69]

For additional guidance on control and coordination measures, refer to Appendix A, "Control and Coordination Measures, of JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

(4) **Battlespace Communications and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems**. The BCS and ISR systems provide commanders with critical support in communications, navigation, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly improves the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally, thereby enhancing the battlespace awareness of commanders at all levels. Effective command at varying operational tempos requires timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and sustainable communications. Communications planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications systems necessary to collect, transport, process, and disseminate critical information at decisive times. These communication systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations.

For additional guidance on the BCS and ISR systems support refer to JPs 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, *and 6-0,* Doctrine for Battlespace Communications System (BCS) Support to Joint Operations.

d. **Collaboration**

(1) **Effective C2 demands that commanders and staffs collaborate** in forming and articulating commander's intent and determining operational objectives, effects, and tasks. Collaboration capabilities can enhance both planning and execution of joint operations. Although these capabilities can improve efficiency and common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction among participants, their potential value is most evident during time-compressed operations associated with both combat and noncombat operations.

(2) A collaborative environment is one in which participants share data, information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts, often in a real-time regardless of physical location. Collaboration capabilities enable planners and operators worldwide to build a plan in components or sub-plans concurrently rather than sequentially, and to integrate their products into the overall plan. Collaboration also provides planners with a "view of the whole" while working on various sections of a plan, which help them identify and resolve planning conflicts early. Commanders at all levels can participate in COA analysis and then select a COA without the traditional sequential briefing process. Plans and orders can be posted on interactive Web pages for immediate use by subordinate elements.

(3) An important result is a compression of the planning/decision timeline. With these collaboration capabilities, JFCs can foster an environment that ensures campaign ends, ways, and means are known and understood at every echelon from the start to the termination of operations. Similar benefits apply during execution, when commanders, planners, and others can decide quickly on branches and sequels to the campaign or operation and on other time-critical actions to respond to changes in the situation. All of this can occur with improved understanding of commander's intent, objectives, desired effects, and required tasks. If properly managed, collaboration can contribute to a more precise planning process and to a more accurate plan execution without sacrificing staff battle rhythm.[70]

e. **Battle Rhythm**. JFC establish a daily operations cycle (or battle rhythm) for briefings, meetings, and report requirements. A battle rhythm is essential to manage the dissemination of information in a coordinated manner. The battle rhythms of the various joint and component commands can be a source of friction, complicated by multiple time zones, if not properly synchronized. Further, the battle rhythm must be designed to prevent principle and other key joint staff members from attending meetings and listening to briefings for much of their shift—it must allow them time to plan, communicate with the JFC, and direct the activities of their subordinates. Furthermore, other planning, decision, and operating cycles (intelligence collection, targeting, and air tasking order (ATO) cycles) influence the joint force headquarters' battle rhythm. Consequently, the joint force staff, components, and supporting agencies should participate in the development of the joint force headquarters' battle rhythm. Those participants must consider the battle rhythm needs of higher, lower, and adjacent commands when developing the joint force headquarters' battle rhythm. The joint force headquarters' battle rhythm normally is administered by the chief of staff.

The key is not to make quick decisions, but to make timely decisions.

General Colin Powell
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

f. **Decisionmaking**. A principal aim of C2 is to enhance the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Decisionmaking is selecting a COA as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission. Decisionmaking includes knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide, and understanding the consequences of decisions. It is both art and science. Information management, battlespace awareness, and the establishment of commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) facilitate decisionmaking. Decisionmaking authority should be decentralized appropriately — it should be delegated to those in the best position to make an adequate, timely decision. An informed and timely decision-making process is required for military success. JFCs and their component commanders must decide what to do, using the decision-making technique best for the circumstances.

For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

5. Organizing the Joint Force

a. **General**. The manner in which JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. **The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs' vision and concept of operations**. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint forces can be established on a **geographic or functional** basis. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed.[71] Organization of joint forces also needs to take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

b. **Joint Force Options**

(1) **Combatant Commands**. A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **Unified commands** typically are established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating single strategic direction or other criteria found in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF*) are met.[72] **Specified commands** normally are composed of forces from one Military Department, but may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments.[73] The UCP defines geographic AORs (i.e., theaters) for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Other combatant commands are

established to perform functional responsibilities such as transportation, SO, training, or strategic operations. Functionally oriented combatant commands can operate across all geographical regions and can provide forces for assignment to other CCDRs. These combatant commands also can conduct operations while reporting directly to the President and Secretary of Defense.

US Central Command forces conducting training operations in their geographic area of responsibility.

(2) **Subordinate Unified Commands**. When authorized by the President and Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands, and exercise operational control (OPCON) of assigned commands and forces and normally of attached forces within the assigned operational or functional area.

(3) **Joint Task Forces**. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing JTF commander to accomplish missions with specific, limited

objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics.[74] JTFs normally are established to achieve operational objectives. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required. JTF headquarters basing depends on the JTF mission, operational environment, and available capabilities and support. JTF headquarters basing options include land-based; land-based then moves afloat while retaining control; sea-based; sea-based, then transitions to a different land-based staff; and sea-based, then moves ashore while retaining control.

For further guidance on JTFs, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

c. **Component Options**. Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, **Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions** and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations.[75] Further, functional and Service components of the joint force **conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not independent campaigns**.[76]

(1) **Service Components**. The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. **Conducting joint operations using Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines**. This arrangement is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components for conducting operations. Logistics remain a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements and memoranda of agreement or as otherwise directed by the CCDR.

(2) **Functional Components**. The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Military Departments

must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and the JFC's attention must be divided between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated, it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders. The nature of operations, Service force with the preponderance of available specific functional component assets, C2 capabilities, and training and resources available to staff and support functional component commands are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander.[77] Functional component staffs should be joint, with Service representation appropriate to the level and type of support to be provided. Functional component staffs require advanced planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

(3) **Combination**. Joint forces often are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Service components normally have SOF organized as a functional component and a designated joint force air component commander (JFACC). However, SOF may be assigned under the OPCON or tactical control (TACON) or in support of other Service or functional component commanders. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. It is essential that SOF not be used as a substitute for conventional forces, but as a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Commanders must ensure that missions identified, nominated, and selected are appropriate and compatible with SOF capabilities. Successful execution of SO require centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2; therefore, it is imperative that SOF assets are assigned or attached with the SOF chain of command intact. Organizational structures established for employment of SOF and C2 through the SOF chain of command are described in JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.

d. The **Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ [CE])** is a full-time, joint, C2 element within the geographic combatant command staff. The SJFHQ (CE) is not staffed in peacetime to be a fully functional, operational headquarters without significant augmentation, mission-specific "plugs, and liaisons." However, it provides the combatant command with a trained and equipped, standing, joint C2 capability. Its principal roles are to enhance the command's situational awareness and peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the efficient formation of a JTF headquarters, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. The SJFHQ (CE) has a daily focus on warfighting and is a fully integrated participant in the staff's planning (deliberate and crisis action), and operations. It leverages technologies and techniques that enable a holistic analysis and understanding of the adversary to identify the pressure points against which the CCDR can focus early, integrated, combined application of instruments of national or multinational power to influence and shape the operating environment to deter or contain a crisis. There are three primary employment options:

(1) **The SJFHQ (CE) can form the core of a JTF headquarters**. In this case, the CCDR designates the SJFHQ (CE) Director or another flag officer as the JFC and augments the SJFHQ (CE) from the combatant command headquarters and components as required.

(2) **The SJFHQ (CE) can augment a Service component headquarters**. Portions of the SJFHQ (CE) can provide additional expertise to a Service component designated as the JTF headquarters.

(3) **The SJFHQ (CE) can support the combatant command headquarters**. In this case, the CCDR is the JFC. The SJFHQ (CE) can remain part of the combatant command staff or serve as the forward element of the joint force headquarters.[78]

e. The **deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC)** is another C2 augmentation capability that a CCDR may establish. It is composed of planners and

operators from the combatant command and components' staffs, which report to the CCDR's Operations Directorate until deployed to a JTF. The DJTFAC has utility, along with the SJFHQ (CE), to CCDRs that anticipate responding to multiple contingencies simultaneously.[79]

For additional and more detailed guidance on the organization of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

6. Organizing the Operational Areas

a. **General**. To assist in the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint action, JFCs may define operational areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. Additionally, JFCs at all levels can designate areas of interest (**AOIs) to focus national agency support for monitoring adversary and potential adversary activities outside the operations area**. An AOI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the adversary can act to affect current or future friendly operations.[80]

b. **Theater-Level Areas**. When warranted, the President and Secretary of Defense or geographic CCDRs may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat (illustrated in Figure II-4). Geographic CCDRs can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the AOR).



Figure II-4. Operational Areas Within a Theater

(1) **Theater of War**. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of military operations. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic CCDR's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.

(2) **Theater of Operations**. A theater of operations is a wartime measure and may not be established without the previous establishment of a theater of war. Geographic CCDRs may further define one or more theaters of operations — that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations — within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different adversary forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are normally associated with MCO.

(3) **Combat Zones and Communications Zones (COMMZs).** Geographic CCDRs also may establish combat zones and COMMZs, as shown in Figure II-5. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR's AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It usually is contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.



Figure II-5. Combat and Communications Zones

c. **Operational- and Tactical-Level Areas**. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, the following operational areas can be established.

(1) **Joint Operations Area (JOA)**. A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic CCDR or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs also are appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

(2) **Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA)**. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of SO. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO in the same general operational area.

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(3) **Joint Rear Area (JRA)**. A JRA is a specific land area within a JFC's operational area **designated by the JFC** to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. JRAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JRAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

For additional guidance on JRAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.

(4) **Amphibious Objective Area**. The amphibious objective area is a geographical area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious

force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and SO.

For additional guidance on amphibious objective areas, refer to JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

(5) **Area of Operations**. JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. AOs typically do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort.

d. **Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas**. Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure II-6). When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas (to include AOIs) are noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; the concept of operations links the elements of the force. A noncontiguous operational area normally is characterized by a 360-degree boundary. The higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous operational areas. During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the Marine Corps forces' rear area was centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound, port, and airfield in the city of Mogadishu, while its operational area was widely scattered around the towns and villages of the interior. The AOI included the rest of the country and particularly those population and relief centers not under the JFC's supervision.[81]



Figure II-6. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

e. **Responsibilities Assumed When Accepting Control of an Operational Area.** The assigned operational area should be activated formally at a specified date and time. At that time, the assigned commander should be capable of providing or coordinating fire support; airspace control measures; force protection; IO, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); personnel recovery (PR); and defensive counterair within the operational area. Operational protection policies and guidelines must be established to include an active effort to protect from sabotage and terrorism directed against personnel, facilities, or equipment in the operational area. Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) operations must be implemented to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area.[82] A coordinated PR plan for the assigned

operational area should be developed, and all assigned forces possessing PR capabilities and assets must be prepared to execute component PR responsibilities and contribute to joint PR efforts. The assuming commander should be able to coordinate with the designated area air defense commander for defensive counterair support when needed.[83]

CHAPTER III
OPERATIONAL DESIGN

"Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan."

Napoleon I, 1769-1821

SECTION A. OVERVIEW

1. General

a. The design of joint campaigns and operations involves the application of operation art in translating strategic guidance and direction into military strategic and operational objectives, desired effects, and component tasks. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense receive guidance and direction from the President through the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CCDRs review their TSCPs and refine the guidance and direction for subordinate JFCs. With collaboration from subordinate JFCs and Service components, CCDRs translate this guidance and theater strategy as outlined in the appropriate TSCP into clearly defined and attainable objectives, desired effects, and component tasks; and then conduct campaigns and operations to accomplish the objectives.

b. When designing campaigns and operations, it is essential to understand that the battlespace is a complex system—a holistic arrangement of interacting political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, religious, and environment systems, among others. Rather than focusing only on the military system, planners must understand the relationships among the various systems, how they affect each other, and their strengths and vulnerabilities. This helps planners better understand the battlespace and how friendly instruments of national power can be employed to achieve desired effects most efficiently.

SECTION B. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL ART

2. Strategic Planning

a. **General**. Strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing joint capabilities across the range of military operations. Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that facilitate transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict operations. When directed to conduct military operations in a specific situation, CCDRs refine peacetime strategies and modify existing operation plans or develop new campaign plans as appropriate. The resulting plan, establishes the operational concepts, military strategic objectives, effects, and resources that contribute to achievement of the desired national strategic end state.

b. **The Desired National Strategic End State**

(1) For specific situations that require the extraordinary employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated MCO), the President and Secretary of Defense typically will establish a set of **national strategic objectives**. This set of objectives comprises the **desired national strategic end state — the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation**. Thinking of this "desired end state" as an integrated package is useful because the national strategic objectives usually are closely related rather than independent. The CCDR often will have a role in more than one objective; and considering the entire desired end state will help affected CCDRs formulate a military end state and termination criteria, which are complementary with other instruments of national power. In the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict, for example, the President established a number of national strategic objectives, including the unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, a guarantee of safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad, and the enhancement of security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Some objectives will be the primary responsibility of the CCDR, while

others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power to achieve, with the CCDR in support of other agencies.

(2) A clearly defined desired end state helps affected CCDRs modify their theater strategic estimate and begin mission analysis even if there is no pre-existing operation plan. In the example above, the CCDR could determine that his mission would include deploying to the Persian Gulf region and ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait if diplomatic actions, economic sanctions, and other nonmilitary efforts failed to achieve this objective. The CCDR also could anticipate that military capability likely would be required in some capacity in support of the other objectives, potentially before, during, and after any required MCO. Commanders and planners must understand that many factors can affect national strategic objectives, possibly causing the desired end state to change even as military operations progress.

(3) Objectives that comprise an end state typically will have associated **"conditions"—prerequisites for achieving the objective**. In the Persian Gulf example, one such condition was the formation of a substantial coalition, which included Arab states, to demonstrate significant formal opposition to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Another condition was obtaining UN support in the form of resolutions and sanctions. A condition related to conducting MCO (to include land attack) was securing Saudi Arabia's agreement to receive and base deploying US forces. After reassessing the preliminary campaign plan, the CCDR determined that an operational level condition for a successful ground attack was the deployment of an additional corps to provide sufficient ground combat power. Conditions provide another source of information and analysis, which helps commanders make decisions and planners revise their estimates and refine mission analysis as campaign or joint operation planning progresses.

c. **The strategic estimate** is a tool available to CCDRs and subordinate JFCs as they develop campaign plans and subordinate operation plans. CCDRs develop strategic estimates after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. JFCs use

strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate a more rapid employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate process helps clarify the CCDR's military end state—the set of military strategic objectives, conditions, and termination criteria that supports the desired national strategic end state and represents what the CCDR wants the situation to be when the campaign or operation concludes. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy. In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COAs. Items contained in the strategic estimate are summarized in Figure III-1 and the format is provided in Appendix B, "The Estimate Process." Commanders employ the estimate to consider the adversary's likely intent and COAs and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision. Both supported and supporting combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support other CCDRs prepare estimates for each supporting operation. The strategic estimate process is continuous.



Figure III-1. Strategic Estimate

d. **Theater strategic concepts** are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors, including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, C2 capabilities, intelligence assets, anticipated postconflict measures, mobilization, deployment, and sustainability. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, military assistance from all Services and supporting commands, and interagency and multinational forces in each COA. Theater strategic concepts should provide for unified action and strategic advantage. Strategic advantage is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of strategic objectives through national, international, and theater efforts. CCDRs use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance

enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. CCDRs also consider and integrate the contributions of the other instruments of national power in gaining and maintaining strategic advantage. Strategic concepts must integrate ends, ways, and means and consider the following.

(1) Protection of US citizens, forces, and interests and implementation of national policies.

(2) Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.

(3) Adjustments for multinational, interagency, or UN circumstances.

(4) Identification of postconflict objectives and measures and termination criteria.

(5) Identification of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.

(6) Support for security assistance or nation assistance.

(7) Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.

3. Linking Objectives, Effects, and Tasks—an Effects-Based Approach

a. **Campaign planning is an effects-based process**. CCDRs conduct theater planning based on development of theater-level strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational effects. At the JTF level, the JFC develops operational-level objectives supported by measurable operational effects. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate theater- or operational-level objectives to component missions, tasks, and/or actions. The focus at this level is on operational art—the employment of military forces to attain military strategic and operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns,

operations, and battles.

b. **An "effect" is a "result"**—a consequence (physical and/or behavioral) brought about by an action. A strategic or operational "effect" is a measurable physical or behavioral state resulting from military (lethal or nonlethal) and/or nonmilitary actions designed to support a strategic or operational objective. **Effects can be both direct and indirect**. A **direct effect** is the immediate, first-order consequence of an action (such as weapons employment results). An **indirect effect** is a delayed and/or displaced consequence associated with the action that caused the direct effect. Indirect effects are often less visible or recognizable than direct effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary's behavior. Undesirable indirect effects, such as collateral damage, often are associated with the direct effects of weapons employment. However, an indirect, displaced effect can actually be the primary one desired. In the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict example, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) identified Saddam Hussein as the strategic COG. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, attempts to convince him to withdraw Iraqi forces (the desired effect associated with a specified national strategic objective) included economic sanctions, coalition building, and deployment of US forces into the region. These actions caused direct effects related to the Iraqi economy, world opinion, and the increasing ability of the coalition to conduct military operations. However, these and other effects proved insufficient to achieve the desired effect of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, leading to Operation DESERT STORM.

c. **Although the focus at the tactical level typically is on weapon effects, an effects-based approach to campaign planning centers on results relative to the behavior of battlespace systems**. Thinking in terms of direct/indirect and desired/undesired effects helps commanders and planners amplify the meaning of broad objectives, determine the best sequence of actions to accomplish them, and develop more precise assessment measures. An effects-based approach also helps commanders and planners use elements of joint operational art more effectively by strengthening the relationships between COGs, decisive points, direct versus indirect approach, termination criteria, and others.

4. Operational Art

a. **Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively** to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. It provides a framework, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.[84]

(1) **Operational art requires broad vision**, the ability to plan, execute, adapt, and assess; and effective joint, interagency, and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces and the threat, but also at how those forces will be deployed and sustained and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities.[85]

(2) Among the many operational considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions.[86]

(a) What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to reach the desired end state? (Ends)

(b) What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce those conditions? (Ways)

(c) How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish

that sequence of actions? (Means)

(d) What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

(e) What **resources** must be committed or **actions** performed to successfully reach the military end state?

(3) The key to operational art lies in the JFC translating the desired end state (i.e., the national strategic objectives) into the desired effects that will achieve that end state. Then identifying the actions that will achieve those effects; matching the actions to required capabilities; and matching those needed capabilities to the available joint, multinational and interagency forces possessing them. Finally, operational art requires the ability to orchestrate effects into a coherent campaign, assess their effectiveness, and adapt as necessary.[87]

b. **Operational Art Elements**. The fundamental elements of operational art are shown in Figure III-2 and discussed below.



Figure III-2. Elements of Operational Art

(1) **Synergy**

(a) JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities in a wide variety of operations across the range of military operations. JFCs not only attack the adversary's physical capabilities, but also the adversary's morale and will. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, contains the basis for this multidimensional concept — one that describes how JFCs can apply all dimensions of joint capability to accomplish their mission.

(b) When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the adversary may be thought of as symmetrical if forces, technologies, and weapons tend to be similar or asymmetric; if forces, technologies, and weapons are different; or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional ROE is the norm. As JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions. See the discussion of leverage.

(c) It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities in isolation. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for

supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full-dimensional operations against the adversary.

(d) The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an adversary to exploit. JFCs are especially suited to develop and project joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available only within joint forces.

(e) The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation. JFCs integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. The JFC's vision of how operations will be conducted includes not only how to arrange operations but also a clear understanding of the desired end state.

(2) **Simultaneity and Depth**. The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of joint operations theory. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple adversary capabilities and adversary will to resist.

(a) Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary's collapse by placing more demands on adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization. For example, following 38 days of intensive and highly synchronized and integrated coalition air operations, land forces initiated two major, mutually supporting, offensive thrusts against defending Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq. Simultaneously, amphibious forces threatened an assault from the

sea, creating confusion within the adversary leadership structure and causing several Iraqi divisions to orient on the amphibious threat. The orientation of these divisions on the sea facilitated their defeat in detail by other air and land forces striking into the heart of Kuwait. Concurrently, coalition air operations continued the relentless attack on deployed troops, C2 nodes, and the transportation infrastructure. The result was a swift conclusion to the Gulf War in 1991, culminated by simultaneous and integrated and synchronized operations by all elements of the coalition.

(b) Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the operation plan. JFCs set the conditions for battles within a major operation to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. Geographic CCDRs integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent inter-relationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon.

(c) The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously expanded the depth of operations. Airpower can maneuver at greater distances, while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. To be effective, JFCs should not allow an adversary sanctuary or respite. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on adversary commanders and resources. The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the adversary throughout the operational area from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation. Interdiction, for example, is one manner in which JFCs use depth to conduct operations.

(d) The concept of depth applies to time as well as to space (geographically). Operations extended in depth shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent's decision cycle. Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying

adversary potential before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

(e) Simultaneity and depth place a premium on shared, common situational awareness at the operational level. JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a common operational picture (COP) of events in the operational area as well as their linkage to future operations and attainment of military strategic objectives.

(f) Advances in technology positively affect simultaneity and depth by promoting enhanced situational awareness. Unfortunately, advances in technology sometimes adversely affect simultaneity and depth by presenting different and competing operational pictures to JFCs and their forces.

Victorious coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM attacked, overwhelmed, and continued with relentless pressure on the retreating opposition.

(3) **Anticipation**

(a) Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with subordinates, higher headquarters, other forces in the operational

area, and allies and coalition members. JFCs avoid surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command and throughout the operational area, thus forcing the adversary to react rather than plan; and by thoroughly and continuously wargaming to identify probable adversary reactions to joint force actions. JFCs also should realize the impact of operations on the adversary, multinational partners, and noncombatants and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces.

(b) Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of friendly capabilities; adversary capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and location and status of displaced persons and refugees enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving military objectives.

(c) Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) assists JFCs in defining likely or potential adversary COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the adversary has embarked on a specific COA. As such, JIPB significantly contributes to a JFC's ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities.

(d) JIPB is a process which enables JFCs and their staffs to visualize adversary capabilities and potential COAs across all dimensions of the battlespace. This process, combined with the COP, other information, and intelligence products provides the JFC with the tools necessary to achieve situational awareness. A joint force produces a COP by using many different products to include the operational pictures of lower, lateral, and higher echelons.

For additional guidance on JIPB, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

(e) Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and planners that tend to lean forward in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational military deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and

planners should carefully consider all available information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information from various dimensions should be employed to reduce risk in the decisionmaking process.

(4) **Balance**

(a) Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted.

(b) JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an adversary's balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight. IO, special operations, interdiction, and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the opponent. Denial of adversary ISR and target acquisition activities contributes to the protection of friendly forces. Even as the joint force defeats one adversary force, it prepares to turn and strike another. High-tempo joint operations set the conditions for battle. JFCs prepare to shift as conditions change and new challenges are presented. Through continuous planning and wargaming, the commander strives never to be without options.

(c) JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.

(d) Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. Combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force responsiveness, not inhibit it. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decision makers and ongoing operations.

(5) **Leverage**

(a) Leverage (that is, gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all domains—air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information) using the forces available to JFCs is "the centerpiece of joint operational art." JFCs gain decisive advantage over the adversary through leverage. This leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against adversary weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the adversary, increase the adversary's dilemma, and maintain the initiative. Force interaction with respect to friendly force command relationships generally can be characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). The command relationships that provide the framework for arranging for such support are discussed extensively in joint doctrine, including elsewhere in this publication. A principal JFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force in all dimensions. Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of command for) various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. The potentially large number of such relationships requires the close attention not only of JFCs, but also of their components to plan and execute.

(b) Force interaction with regard to adversary forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against adversary forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement,

extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an adversary in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks against adversary ground formations in convoy (the air and SOF interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval air attacks against troop transports (US air attacks against Japanese surface reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against adversary naval, air, or missile bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities against the various aspects of adversary capabilities.

(c) As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from adversary symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action.

(d) Dimensional superiority, isolation of the adversary, and attack of adversary critical vulnerabilities can contribute to joint force leverage and are addressed in Chapter IV, “Major Combat Operations.”

(6) **Timing and Tempo**

(a) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the adversary’s ability to react. In its 1940 attack on France, for example, Germany combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations. France capitulated in little more than a month.

(b) The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating adversary commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to overwhelm adversary defensive capabilities.

(c) Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that integrates and synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations.

(d) Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. JFCs plan and conduct operations in a manner that integrates and synchronizes the effects of operations so the maximum benefit of their contributions are felt by the opponent at the desired time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate impact, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in an integrated and synchronized manner. Additionally, commanders and planners strive to ensure that objectives achieved through combat operations build toward decisive results, but are not unduly or inappropriately felt by opponents long after their defeat.

(7) **Operational Reach and Approach**

(a) On the first page of *On War*, Clausewitz likens war to a duel. In joint operational art, effective symmetrical attack (fully supported by all components of the joint force) and asymmetrical attack constitute the dueler's sword; the actions of air, land,

sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities to protect each other is the dueler's shield; and, in its broadest sense, logistics and basing are the dueler's footing, affecting the reach of the sword and the strength and resiliency of the shield. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, directly affects operational reach. Likewise, logistic support sustains combat operations and is a component of operational reach.

(b) Operational reach is the distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively. Reach may be influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It may be extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward; by increasing the range of weapon systems; by conducting aerial refueling; by maximizing use of HN and contract support; by including space support capabilities; and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of LOCs and throughput.

(c) Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly influencing the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing often is affected directly by political and diplomatic considerations and, as such, can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) typically are selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from adversary attacks.

Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived in terms of lines of operations.

(d) **Lines of Operations**. As JFCs visualize the concept of the operation they may use lines of operations to describe the linkage of various actions on decisive points using lines of operations. Lines of operations define the orientation of the operation in time, space, or purpose in relation to the enemy or objective. Commanders may describe the operation along lines of operations that are geographic, logical, or both. In **geographic** terms, lines of operation connect a series of actions on decisive points that lead to control of the geographic objective or defeat of the enemy force. **Logical** lines of operations link multiple actions on decisive points with the logic of purpose to defeat an enemy or achieve an objective. Normally, joint operations require commanders to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary lines of operations working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to achieve the military end state. Generally geographic lines of operations drive the need for linear operations and logical lines of operation drive nonlinear aspects of operational design. Logical lines of operations and geographical lines of operations are not mutually exclusive and joint force commanders often combine them. Often, this combination accomplishes in a single joint operation what formerly took an entire campaign.[88]

1. JFCs use **logical lines of operations** to visualize and describe the operation when positional reference to an enemy or adversary has little relevance. This situation is common in many joint force operations. JFCs link multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose—cause and effect. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of lines of operations may be evident. Multiple and complementary lines of operations work through a series of objectives. Commanders synchronize activities along multiple lines of operations to achieve the desired end state. Logical lines of operations also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.

2. Commanders use **geographical lines of operations** to connect the

force with its base of operations and when positional reference to the enemy is a factor. Geographical lines of operation may be either interior or exterior. A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate adversary forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the adversary. A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

(7) **Forces and Functions**

(a) Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and adversary forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

(b) JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical adversary functions such as C2, logistics, and air and missile defense. Attack of an adversary's functions normally is intended to destroy adversary balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical adversary functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in adversary leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of adversary capability and will. The appropriateness of functional attack as the principal design concept frequently is based on time required and available to cripple adversary critical functions as well as the adversary's current actions and likely response to such attacks.

(8) **Arranging Operations**

(a) JFCs must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to accomplish the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve dimensional superiority and the desired end state conditions, quickly, with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, force protection, distribution and sustainment capabilities, adversary reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose.

(b) Critical to the success of the entire operation is timely and accurate time-phased force and deployment data. However, the dynamic nature of modern warfare requires adaptability concerning the arrangement of operations. During force projection, for example, a rapidly changing adversary situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

(c) **Logistics** is crucial to arranging operations and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility. JFCs and joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining LOCs, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new operations, and defining priorities for services and support.[89]

(d) **Phases**. Reaching the desired end state usually requires the conduct of several operations. Consequently, the design of a joint campaign or a operation normally provides for related phases implemented over time. Phases are described in campaign/operation plans as sequential, but during execution a joint force rarely completes one phase before beginning another—there will be some simultaneous

execution. In a campaign, each phase can represent a single or several major operations, while in a major operation a phase normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize a group of related operations into more manageable parts, thereby allowing for flexibility in execution while enhancing unity of effort.

(e) **Branches and Sequels**. Many operation plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into their plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing.

1. **Branches are options built into the basic plan**. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of adversary action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

2. **Sequels are subsequent operations** based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

(9) **Centers of Gravity and Critical Factors**

(a) COGs are agents or sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed." At the strategic level, COGs might include a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, or national will. An operational COG, on the other hand, normally is something more tangible, for example, a powerful element of the adversary's armed forces. Commanders consider not only the enemy COGs, but also identify and protect their own

COGs. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, for example, USCENTCOM identified the coalition itself as the friendly COG, and the CCDRs took measures to protect it, to include deployment of theater missile defense systems. All COGs have inherent "critical capabilities" enabling them to function as COGs. In turn, all critical capabilities have essential "critical requirements" necessary for the realization of those capabilities. **Critical vulnerabilities are those critical requirements or components thereof, which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner achieving decisive results, disproportional to the military resources applied**. Collectively, these are referred to as "**critical factors**."

(b) The concept of COGs and critical vulnerabilities is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to assist JFCs and staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Analysis of COGs and critical vulnerabilities, both friendly and adversary, is a continuous process throughout a major operation or campaign. This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion as to the adversary COGs because of a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences. Specifically, the inability to achieve the military strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expenditure of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational effects can result. Accordingly, a great deal of thought and analysis must take place before the JFC and staff can determine proper COGs with any confidence.

(c) Identification of adversary COGs and critical vulnerabilities requires knowledge of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause critical vulnerabilities to change and adjust friendly operations accordingly.

(d) The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass one's strength against an appropriate combination of adversary critical requirements (preferably

vulnerable critical requirements) to neutralize, weaken, or destroy COGs in a cost-effective manner. At any given time during the course of an operation, critical capabilities and associated critical requirements can change; or certain critical capabilities and requirements may not yet exist. For example, an adversary critical capability might be contingent upon his forces being massed. If that mass is not yet formed, keeping it from being realized could be vitally important.

(e) It also is important to protect friendly critical capabilities and critical requirements to prevent the latter from becoming critical vulnerabilities. Examples can be long sea and air LOCs from CONUS or supporting theaters, or public opinion which also can be a friendly COG (as was the case for the United States during the latter years of the Vietnam War).[90]

(10) **Direct versus Indirect**. In theory, direct attacks against adversary COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory — if it can be done in a prudent manner (as defined by the military and political dynamics of the moment). Where direct attacks against adversary COGs mean attacking into an opponent's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this manner, the adversary's derived critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For example, if the operational COG is a large adversary force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs (including resupply), and defeating or degrading its protection functions, such as air defenses and indirect fire capability. In this way, JFCs will employ a synchronized combination of operations to weaken adversary COGs indirectly by attacking traditional weaknesses (e.g., seams and flanks) and critical requirements (e.g., military morale and public opinion), which are sufficiently vulnerable.[91]

(11) **Decisive Points**

(a) In determining where and how to apply friendly capabilities to exploit adversary critical vulnerabilities, planners will have to identify the decisive points. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows a commander can gain a marked advantage over the adversary and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points usually are geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or an air base and could include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications and/or intelligence nodes. In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points, such as attainment of air or naval superiority or commitment of the adversary's reserve. In still other cases, decisive points may be systemic, such as C2 systems and refueling or ammunition storage capability. Decisive points, though, are not COGs; they are the keys to attacking protected COGs or defending them.

(b) Normally, there will be more decisive points in an operational area than JFCs can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. As part of operational art, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which points offer the best opportunity to indirectly attack the adversary's COGs. The commander then designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates sufficient resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.

(c) Geographic, key event, or systemic decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. Controlling these points in the attack assists commanders to gain freedom of operational maneuver. They thus maintain the momentum of the attack and sustain the initiative. If a defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker's momentum and facilitate the defender's counterattack.

(12) **Culmination**

(a) Culmination has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite emergence of the adversary's defensive culmination.

(b) Integration and synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve military strategic and operational objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot generate these resources, they should rethink their concept of operations.

(13) **Termination**

(a) Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key to bringing the desired end state to fruition. Before forces are committed, the supported JFC must know how the President and Secretary of Defense intend to terminate the joint operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. Termination design is driven in part by the nature of the conflict itself. Disputes over territorial or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation,

persuasion, and coercion. Conflicts based in ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, conflicts are a result of both value- and interest-based differences.

(b) The underlying causes of a particular conflict — such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic — must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for joint operation termination and conflict resolution. Ideally, national and allied or coalition decisionmakers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to terminate military involvement. Passing the lead from the military to other authorities usually requires extensive planning and preparation prior to the onset of operations. Further, joint operations also should be conducted in a manner that will ease this transition.

(c) Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies or coalition partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the adversary. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other forms of resistance such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

(d) Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure.[92] When planning a joint operation, the supported JFC and the subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the desired end state, and the plans and operations that will most affect the adversary's judgment of cost and risk to determine the conditions necessary to bring it to a favorable end. The CCDR then will consult with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to establish the termination criteria. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, it must be understood that US forces must be dominant in not only the decisive operations phase, but also the transition phase to achieve the

leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution.[93] If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities and to dissuade other "spoilers" from interfering. Moreover, the desired end state for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces have gained and can maintain.

SECTION C. JOINT OPERATION DESIGN

5. Campaign Design

a. A **campaign** is joint by nature and generally described as a series of related major operations. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign. Campaigns synchronize and integrate necessary air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations — as well as interagency coordination and multinational operations — in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national strategic and multinational objectives.[94] Campaigns and operations can span a wide variety of situations, from quick-hitting, limited-objective operations to broad-based, long-term campaigns.[95]

b. A **campaign plan** describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose.[96] Campaign plans are unique, with considerations that set them apart from other plans. These plans, which may be required by the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of military involvement, synchronize and integrate operations by defining objectives; establishing command relationships among subordinate commands; describing concepts of operations and sustainment; arranging operations in time, space, and purpose; assigning tasks; organizing forces; and synchronizing and integrating air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations.[97] Campaign plans provide the basis for operation plans and orders. Although not formally submitted under the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), campaign plans may require review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[98]

THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing "all necessary means," including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following major phases.

- **DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence)**
- **DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing)**
- **OFFENSE**
- **POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment)**

DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP. While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition's military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT's selected course of action before engaging adversary forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort—from both land and sea—against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar

capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to adversary commanders, destroy adversary forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the adversary. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

VARIOUS SOURCES[99]

c. **Campaign Planning**. Although not formally part of the JOPES, campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. Based on the campaign plan, appropriate elements then are translated into an operation order for execution.[100]

(1) **Campaigns are planned by applying operational art**. How operational art is applied will vary with the nature of operational conditions and strategic objectives, the time and space available in the theater, and the number and type of forces involved.[101]

Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.[102]

(2) **Campaign planning, like all joint operation planning, is based on evolving assumptions and an understanding of the adversary's capabilities and potential COAs**. It is characterized by the need to plan for related, simultaneous, and sequential or parallel operations and the imperative to accomplish strategic objectives through these operations.[103] Campaign planning should accommodate the variety of potential scenarios and provide JFCs a flexible range of capabilities and options from which to organize forces and plan and conduct operations.[104]

(3) **The strategic environment is considered to determine potential constraints**. Constraints may include the availability and capability of forces, sustainment, or ROE. These constraints often limit the JFC's freedom of action and influence the timing and form of the campaign.[105]

(4) **Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined military strategic or operational objectives**. The more complex the campaign or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate. Whenever possible, JFCs at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and preparation.[106]

(5) **Once military operations are contemplated, planning for campaigns and operations becomes a continuous process**. Before initiation of combat operations, commanders also must focus on future operations. During operations, commanders must refine their focus on future operations by assessing the outcome of current operations.[107]

d. **Subordinate and Supporting Plans**. Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans and, under uncertain circumstances, the framework of a series of operation plans for phases of campaigns.[108]

(1) **Subordinate Campaign Plans**. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) military strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration. Subordinate campaign plans are consistent with the strategy, guidance, and direction developed by the CCDR.[109]

(2) **Supporting Plans**. Supporting plans are prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders through an iterative process of collaboration to best satisfy the requirements of the supported commander's plan. Typically, supporting commands' plans provide augmentation forces, force enhancements, or functional support such as logistics and communications. Supporting plans address such discrete operations as nuclear operations, mobilization, deployment and redeployment operations, force protection, and Service support operations, as well as plans for generating and focusing national resources in one or more theaters.[110]

For additional guidance on campaigns and campaign design, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.[111]

6. Phasing[112]

a. Phasing is a basic tenet of campaign and operation plan design. Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, that cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations. Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving major objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign, by which plans to mitigate this risk may be developed.

b. The JFC's vision of how a campaign or operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists in framing commander's intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities.

c. The actual phases used will vary with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Consequently, phases normally are designed to be conducted sequentially, but are likely to overlap and be executed concurrently to some extent. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

d. There is no clear-cut division, but rather interim periods, between phases. The required adjustments during these periods should be included in the operational design. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by the need to make a major shift in focus of the joint force, but that need does not arise on a predetermined time schedule. It is normally driven by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. An example is the shift of focus from sustained air, land, sea, information, and/or special operations in the "decisive operations" phase to stability operations in the "transition" phase. The continuum of hostilities gradually lessens as the joint force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government; and deters "spoilers" from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community takes steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This challenge demands an agile

shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks; and coordination with a wider range of other organizations—OGAs, multinational partners, international organizations, and NGOs—to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.[113]

e. Although the commander will determine the actual phases used during a campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in Figure III-3 and described below provides a flexible model to arrange combat and noncombat operations. These phases can be applied throughout the range of military operations.



Figure III-3. Phasing Model

(1) **Deter/Engage**. This phase may be for deterring aggression or taking action against threats to national or multinational interests. Stability operations likely will be prominent in this phase. Effective crisis response depends on gaining early warning of potential situations that may require military action. Early warning can best be accomplished through knowledge of conditions in the AOR and by the frequent interaction and liaison with allies, coalition partners, and potential challengers. Actions during a deter/engage phase may require mobilization and other predeployment activities to set the terms and conditions for operations in follow-on phases. JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with RC mobilization authority and response times.[114] During predeployment activities, JFCs exercise flexible deterrent options and tailor forces for

deployment. The mission-tailored BCS, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the deter/engage phase to support the JFC concepts of operations. ISR assets are employed during this phase to provide real-time and near-real-time battlespace awareness. Additionally, when in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift, airlift, and pre-position capabilities are critical to JFC concepts. CCDRs also take actions to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for future crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with nonmilitary organizations and other agencies assist in setting conditions for future military operations. During this phase, the CCDR expands partnerships, enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises.

Quick and decisive deployment of combat forces may stabilize the situation and obviate actual hostilities.

(2) **Seize Initiative**. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary's initial aggression and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive

combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the decisive operations phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In noncombat operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.

(3) **Decisive Operations**. The decisive operations phase continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible and includes full employment of joint force capabilities. In combat situations this phase focuses on driving the adversary to culmination through offensive and defensive actions and achieving military strategic and/or operational objectives. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering. Operations in this phase depend upon overmatching joint force at the critical time and place. This requires the necessary C2 and logistic base. Decisive operations focus on winning by achieving full spectrum dominance. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion, setting the conditions for the transition phase. In this case, stability operations likely will be prominent.

(4) **Transition**. The transition phase enables the JFC to focus on synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring the joint operation to a successful conclusion — achievement of the termination criteria. These conditions typically are characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations, establishment of representative government and the rule of law, reconstitution of infrastructure, a growing market economy, and development of civil society. This phase usually has three segments — stability, transfer of authority, and redeployment. A stability segment often is necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself or, in noncombat situations, to ensure where possible that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur. During this portion, primarily stability operations are conducted

and joint forces likely will conduct those operations in support of OGAs, NGOs, and international organizations. Throughout this segment the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the termination criteria. At the end of the transition phase, the JFC may retain responsibility for a follow-on operation or may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. The JFC should identify redeployment requirements as early as possible.

7. Key Plan Elements

a. **General**. The JFC establishes the key operation plan elements — mission statement, commander's intent, concept of operations, concept of logistics, CCIR, and initial tasks for subordinate units. These elements allow the greatest possible operational and tactical freedom for subordinate leaders. Taken together, they should be flexible enough to permit leaders to seize opportunities consistent with the commander's intent, thus facilitating decentralized execution during operations. The key plan elements not only affect the current operation, but also set the stage for future operations.

b. The joint plan or operation **mission statement** is the expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. Orders and planning guidance from senior authorities contain both specified and implied tasks. During mission analysis, the JFC translates these tasks into the joint force mission statement. Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the joint operation, is vital to success.

c. **Commander's Intent**

(1) The JFC's intent describes the military end state and purpose of the joint operation. It is not a summary of the concept of operations. It may include how the posture of joint forces at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It also may include the commander's assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation and the adversary commander's intent.

(2) JFCs begin to form their intent as they conduct mission analysis. Together, with the higher headquarters' order, the JFC's intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. JFCs initially provide their intent verbally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance. JFCs refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the commander's estimate.

(3) The intent statement usually is written, but could be verbal when time is short. It should be concise and clear. The intent should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. The JFC's intent helps subordinate commanders pursue the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. A JFC's order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.

d. **Concept of Operations**

(1) The concept of operations describes how the JFC visualizes the operation will unfold based on the selected COA. This concept expresses what, where, and how the joint force will affect the adversary or the situation at hand. The commander provides sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions. In the concept of operations, JFCs describe the overall objectives of the joint force, the tasks assigned to components of the force, and how the components will work together to accomplish the joint force mission.

(2) To reinforce intent and priorities, commanders typically designate a main effort (for each phase, if the campaign or operation has more than one phase). This practice is applicable throughout the range of military operations. These designations provide focus to the operation, set priorities and determine risks, promote unity of effort, and facilitate an understanding of the commander's intent.

(3) The concept for air, land, and naval maneuver needs to be articulated in the JFC's concept of operations and should include timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. The JFC's concept of maneuver should describe how its application can assist in attacking the adversary's COGs. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, sustained action on land, and sustained air operations. JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with Service doctrine on air, land, and naval maneuver.[115]

(4) The **concept of fires** describes how tactical, operational, and strategic fires **— the effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons —** are integrated and synchronized to support the concept of operations. The JFC determines the adversary's COGs and how the application of fires can assist in their destruction or neutralization. While some fires will support operational and tactical movement and maneuver by air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces, other fires are independent of maneuver and orient on achieving specific operational and strategic effects that support the military operational and strategic objectives.

For additional guidance on fires and joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

e. **Concept of Logistics**[116]

(1) The JFC's concept of logistics is a key part of the integration and synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, employment, entry, application, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of joint forces. The logistic concept thus enables the JFC to develop his concept of operations and scheme of employment in a holistic manner. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. Logistic considerations are key to the commander's estimate process, will greatly impact on the development of COAs, and may dictate COA selection.

(2) COCOM gives CCDRs authoritative direction over all aspects of logistics necessary to accomplish the mission. Within their commands, CCDRs use this authority to ensure effectiveness and economy in operations and to prevent or eliminate the unnecessary duplication of facilities and the overlap of functions among Service components. In critical situations, CCDRs may modify the normal logistic process within their commands. They may use all facilities and supplies of all assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission.

(3) JFCs ensure that the concept of logistics supports the concept of operations. The logistic concept of the campaign plan does this by establishing a base of operations, opening and maintaining LOCs, providing intermediate bases of operations to support phasing and sustainment, and establishing priorities for service and support for each phase of a campaign. The logistic concept also uses available host-nation support (HNS).

For more information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, *and JP 4-01.4,* Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution.

f. **Commander's Critical Information Requirements**. CCIR are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the JFC to the joint force staff and components to facilitate timely decisionmaking and information management. CCIR result from the analysis of information requirements against the commander's concept of operations and decision points and are normally limited in number.[117] The key subcomponents are priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). CCIR may include environmental factors. Satisfying an individual requirement normally prompts a command decision.

8. Key Considerations

a. **IO** integrate the employment of core capabilities in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial

human and automated decision making while protecting friendly decision making. The **core capabilities** are psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). The **supporting capabilities** are physical security, information assurance (IA), CI, and physical attack. The **related capabilities** are PA and CMO. IO planned and integrated properly will enhance joint operations. The focus is to integrate these capabilities to achieve specific information-related objectives, whether those operations are the primary or a supporting effort of national strategy in an operational area. To achieve its potential, IO need to be an integral part of the joint operation's design from its inception, It is incumbent upon the JFC to ensure that IO planners are integrated into the overall joint operation planning staff.

(1) **Characteristics and Purposes**. IO are scalable from the strategic level through the operational and tactical levels. IO, at all levels should reflect and be consistent with broader national security policy and the desired end state. IO are flexible in that IO capabilities can be employed in concert before and/or after "hostilities" to achieve stability operations objectives. IO may be used to deter, discourage, dissuade, and direct an adversary, thereby disrupting unity of command and purpose while preserving friendly unity of command and purpose. The effects which IO capabilities may contribute to an operation are diverse. For instance, IO misdirect adversary plans and protect friendly plans, thereby allowing joint forces to mass their effects to maximum advantage while the adversary expends resources to little effect. Or, IO may be used to control adversarial communications and networks and protect friendly communications and networks, thereby crippling the enemy's ability to direct an organized defense while preserving effective C2 of joint forces. By extension, when executed to maximum effect, seizing control of adversary communications and networks will allow JFCs to control the adversary's network and communications-dependent weapons, infrastructure, C2, and battlespace management functions.

(2) **IO and the Levels of War**. Most IO are conducted to achieve or support strategic or operational objectives. **Strategic level IO** may be included in the spectrum

of activities directed by the Secretary of Defense to achieve national strategic objectives by influencing or affecting all elements (political, military, economic, or informational) of an adversary's or potential adversary's national power. This requires a high degree of coordination between the military and OGAs. The focus of **operational-level IO** is on affecting the adversary's will or desire to fight, decisionmaking, LOCs, C2, and related capabilities and activities while protecting similar friendly capabilities and activities. The primary focus of **tactical-level IO** is on affecting an adversary's will or desire to fight, decisionmaking, C2, intelligence, and other information-based processes directly related to the conduct of military operations while protecting similar friendly capabilities.[118]

(3) **Conduct**. Effective IO combine the effects of offensive and defensive IO to produce **joint operation effects** on critical vulnerabilities. During planning for offensive and defensive IO, the impact on both friendly and adversary information and information systems must be assessed. In practice, IO must be continuous and complementary across the range of military operations. Since all human activity takes place in the information dimension, all human activity is potentially subject to IO. However, economy of force dictates that only mission-related "critical" psychological, electronic, and physical "points" in the information dimension be "targeted," directly or indirectly. IO planners consider all the adversary's instruments of national power to determine how best to conduct IO. Since destruction is an option that may be used to affect adversary information and information systems, the integration of IO into offensive operations is a fundamental approach. Further, IO, combined with information management and ISR, seeks to gain and maintain **information superiority**, which creates conditions that allow JFCs to prepare the operational environment and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power. ROE affect the means used and the effects sought in any given situation.

(a) **Offensive IO** involve the integrated use of core and supporting capabilities to affect adversary decisionmakers to the degree that will cause them to modify personal actions, or direct their subordinates to modify or cease actions, that threaten accomplishment of strategic and operational objectives. Offensive IO should be part of collapsing the adversary COG by attacking critical vulnerabilities that are

identified as objectives for the joint force. The capabilities employed may include special information operations (SIO) and computer network attack (CNA).

(b) **Defensive IO** integrate and coordinate policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly decisionmakers from adversary IO. Defensive IO are conducted through IA, OPSEC, physical security, counter deception, counterpropaganda, CI, EW, SIO, and computer network defense (CND). Defensive IO ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes. Offensive IO also can support defensive IO.[119]

(4) **Legal and Policy Issues**. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval. IO planners at all levels should consider domestic and international criminal and civil laws affecting national security, privacy, and information exchange; international treaties and agreements, both military and commercial; and the structure and relationships among US intelligence organizations, NGOs, and international organizations.[120]

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 1991

Before the beginning of the air operation, operations security (OPSEC) and deception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership's perception of what the coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on destroying or disrupting the Iraqi command and control system, limiting the leadership's ability to gather accurate information and to transmit its decisions. During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hide the preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forces and air strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait. Psychological operations, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the front-line Iraqi soldier's confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of these capabilities was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation when it began.

VARIOUS SOURCES

For further guidance on information operations, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

(7) **Core Capabilities**

(a) **PSYOP**. All military operations have a psychological effect on all parties concerned — friendly, neutral, and hostile.[121] PSYOP are actions to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences. They are designed to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP have strategic, operational, and tactical applications, including support to MILDEC operations.[122] Supporting PSYOP and other informational activities designed to induce or reinforce favorable foreign attitudes and behavior must be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect.[123] The PSYOP approval process, consistent with the JSCP, should be addressed and specified early in the planning process. PSYOP forces assigned to a joint force will provide PSYOP planning and C2 for PSYOP units. They also develop PSYOP programs and products to facilitate the JFC's mission by producing, distributing, and disseminating PSYOP media. PSYOP can contribute to all aspects of joint operations through the following five primary missions:

1. Advising the supported commander through the targeting process regarding psychological actions, psychological enabling actions, and targeting restrictions to be executed by the military force;

2. Providing support to humanitarian activities that ease suffering and restore or maintain civil order;

3. Serving as the supported commander's voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC's intent;

4. Countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information during overseas operations to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and effect the

political will of multinational partners within an operational area. Note: Successful joint operations may hinge on direct control of or direct influence over the operational area mediums of mass communication (radio and television).

5. Influencing foreign populations by expressing information subjectively in order to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with friendly military operations.

For additional guidance on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. PSYOP support to non-US military is outlined in DOD Directive S-3321-1.[124]

(b) **MILDEC**, as executed by JFCs, targets adversary decisionmakers through the adversary intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. MILDEC depend on intelligence to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception effort.[125] This deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their decision-making processes. Anticipation is key. During the formulation of the commander's concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the JFC would like the adversary to act at critical points in the battle. Those desired adversary actions then become the MILDEC goal. MILDEC is focused on causing the opponents to act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking. The purpose is to cause opposing commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions, misappropriate their intelligence collection assets, or fail to employ combat or support units to their best advantage.[126]

1. MILDEC Planning is top-down, in the sense that subordinate deception plans support the higher level plan. Commanders at all levels can plan military deception operations. Strategic or operational plans may include the employment of lower-level units, although subordinate commanders may not know of the overall

deception effort. It is therefore essential for commanders to coordinate their MILDEC plans with their senior commander to ensure overall unity of effort.[127]

2. MILDEC operations are not without cost. Forces and resources must be committed to the deception effort to make it believable, possibly to the short-term detriment of some aspects of the campaign. OPSEC may dictate that only a select group of senior commanders and staff officers in the joint force know which actions are purely deceptive in nature. This situation can cause confusion within the force and must be closely monitored by those commanders and staff officers.

For additional guidance on military deception, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

VARIOUS SOURCES

(c) **OPSEC**. History has shown the value and need for reliable, adequate, and timely intelligence, and the harm that results from its inaccuracies and absence. It is therefore vital and advantageous to deny adversary commanders the critical information they need (essential secrecy) and cause them to derive inaccurate, timely appreciations that influence their actions (desired appreciations). **OPSEC is a process of planning and action to gain and maintain essential secrecy about the JFC's actual capabilities, activities, and intentions**. OPSEC is applied to all military activities at all levels of command. The JFC should provide OPSEC planning guidance to the staff at the time of the commander's decision and, subsequently, to subordinate and supporting commanders in the chain of command. By maintaining liaison and coordinating the OPSEC planning guidance, the JFC will ensure unity of effort in gaining and maintaining the essential secrecy considered necessary for success.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.[128]

(d) **EW** is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the adversary. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering adversary systems. This control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function. **The three major subdivisions of EW are electronic attack** (EA)**, electronic protection, and EW support**, which may overlap. Some EW actions may be both offensive and protective in nature and may inherently use electronic surveillance in their execution. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall military strategic and operational objectives, but also on the risks of possible adversary responses and other effects on the campaign effort. The JFC should ensure maximum coordination among EW and other operations, activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for maximum effect. This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support.

For additional EW guidance, refer to JP 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations.[129]

(e) **CNO** are the combination of military actions designed to exploit, intrude, or attack an adversary's computers, computer networks and/or resident information, while preventing similar actions from being taken against friendly computers and computer networks. CNO usually consist of the application of the following three computer network disciplines—CNA, CND, and computer network exploitation (CNE). **CNA** operations disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. EA can be used against a computer, but it is not CNA, since relies on the data stream to execute the attack while EA relies on the electromagnetic spectrum. An example of the two operations is the following: sending a code or instruction to a central processing unit that causes the computer to short out the power supply is CNA. Using an electromagnetic pulse device to destroy a computer's electronics and causing the same result is EA. **CND** includes actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks. **CNE** involves enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.[130]

(8) **Supporting Capabilities**. A robust security program that integrates IA, physical security, CI, and OPSEC with risk management procedures offers the best chance to protect friendly information and information systems from adversary efforts.

(a) **IA** is defined as measures that protect and defend electronic information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. IA for DOD information and information systems requires a defense-in-depth that integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayer and multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must account for the possibility that

access can be gained to its information and information systems from outside of DOD control. Conversely, information obtained directly from sources outside of the Department of Defense is not subject to DOD IA processes and procedures. Lack of DOD IA control over information and information systems neither guarantees that the quality of information obtained within the Department of Defense is unimpeachable, nor that non-DOD information and information systems is implicitly of lower quality. **IA incorporates protection, detection, response, restoration, and reaction capabilities and processes to shield and preserve information and information systems**.

(b) **Physical Security**. Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats; applying appropriate deterrent, control, and denial safeguarding techniques and measures; and responding to changing conditions. Functions in physical security include facility security, law enforcement, guard operations, special security areas, and other physical security operations like guard dog operations or emergency and disaster response support.

(c) **CI** consist of information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. The functions of CI include operations, investigations, collection, and analysis and production. CI **operations** are proactive activities designed to identify, exploit, neutralize, or deter foreign intelligence collection and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense. CI **investigations** are conducted to prove or disprove an allegation of espionage or other intelligence activities. CI **collection** is the systematic acquisition of information (through investigations, operations, or liaison) concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, other intelligence activities, or assassinations that are directed against or threaten DOD interests. CI **analysis and production** consists of the process of analyzing all-source information

concerning espionage or other multidiscipline intelligence collection threats, sabotage, terrorism, and other related threats to United States military commanders, the DOD, and the United States intelligence community and developing it into a final product that is disseminated. CI production is used in formulating security policy, plans, and operations. CI procedures are a critical part of guarding friendly information and information systems from "insiders."

(9) **Related Capabilities**

(a) **PA**. JFCs conduct PA operations to communicate unclassified information about joint force activities to internal, domestic, and international audiences. Its role in IO is to be the first line of defense against adversary propaganda and disinformation by providing a continuous flow of credible, reliable, timely, and accurate information to military members, their families, the media, and the public. When supporting deployed operations, personnel engaged in PA should be sent early into a theater in sufficient strength to begin effective operations. Dramatic media coverage at the outset of a military action can rapidly influence public and political opinion and affect strategic decisionmaking. The release of information concerning operations should be integrated into the branches, sequels, and phases of the planning effort. Without preplanning, release of information often is incomplete and too late to have an impact through fast-acting world media organizations. Since each branch, sequel, or phase normally is based on some measurable event, PA planning should include development and subsequent delivery of media releases by spokespersons thoroughly familiar with objectives of the operations. With effective preplanning of information release, the effects of other campaign efforts may be amplified and adversary media releases may be made less effective. PA also assists commanders by providing trusted counsel; enhancing morale and readiness; fostering public trust and support; and leveraging global influence and deterrence.[131]

1. The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for PA more important than in the past. Media

reporting influences public opinion, which may in turn affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and ultimately influence the success or failure of the operation. The speed with which the media can collect and convey information to the public makes it possible for the world populace to become aware of an incident as quickly as, or even before, a JFC or USG decisionmakers.

2. The JFC should develop a well-defined and concise PA plan to minimize adverse effect upon the joint operation from inaccurate media reporting/analysis and promulgation of disinformation and misinformation. PA plans should provide for open and independent reporting, anticipate and respond to media queries, which provide the maximum disclosure with minimum delay and create an environment between the JFC and reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. An effective plan provides ways to communicate information about an operation and fulfills the US military's obligation to keep the American public informed while maintaining requisite OPSEC. Additionally, a PA plan can help thwart possible media attempts to acquire and disseminate classified information, which might compromise joint force security.[132]

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

(b) **CMO** is a broad term used to denote the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. CMO may include activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They also may occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations.[133]

b. **Targeting**

(1) Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting provides the focus and process for linking the effects based approach to actions or tasks at the component level. As with all actions of the joint force, targeting and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law and the ROE approved by the President or Secretary of Defense for the operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal advisors must consider the desired end state, political goals, and legal constraints when making targeting decisions.

(2) **Effective targeting** is distinguished by the ability of the joint force to identify targets and target options (lethal and nonlethal) to achieve desired effects that support the JFC's objectives, guidance, and intent. Because targeting occurs as all levels of command within a joint force, inputs (targets) are required from each component and staff element in order to meet this goal. Mechanisms (i.e., boards, centers, cells) are established to create a process by which necessary information can be assimilated into a robust targeting process that is responsive to fixed and mobile targets, time-sensitive targets, and targets identified during IO. Processing effective targeting information requires the mechanisms to be synchronized such that timeliness of targeting information can be put into action.

(3) **Organizational structure**. In its application, an orchestrated staff effort combining staff estimates, JIPB, and target-value analysis in conjunction with analyses of the enemy determines where military resources should be applied. The structure established by the JFC must facilitate the joint targeting process and be responsive to both planned and immediate targets. The structure must be able to facilitate and create the joint force's ability to coordinate, deconflict, prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and

assess joint operations by applying focused, effects-based, interdisciplinary, and systematic joint targeting principles.

(4) The **Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)** rests on fundamental principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and distinction (discrimination)**;** which also apply to targeting decisions. There is a strong relationship between international law and targeting, i.e., the legal focus of joint targeting is the LOAC. An understanding of the application of the LOAC is critical in the joint targeting process, since the selection of targets includes an analysis of the legality of attacking specific targets under international law. Accordingly, all plans, ROE, commander's guidance, and targets will be reviewed by a legal advisor to the JFC for compliance with applicable law and policy. The JFC may prohibit or restrict joint force attacks on specific targets based on political considerations, military risk, the LOAC, and ROE. The joint force staff judge advocate section must be continuously involved in all phases of target development.

Refer to JP 1-04, JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations, for more detailed information and guidance on targeting and the LOAC.

(5) **Targeting Process**. Joint targeting "cycles" have been established to assist the joint force day-to-day targeting requirements. These cycles are flexible and are established, reviewed, and adjusted by the JFC and staff as required. Commander's guidance drives the phases of the targeting cycle and its importance is paramount. Clear, quantifiable, and achievable objectives and their understanding are the most important factors in the joint targeting process.

(6) **Command and Control**

(a) **Oversight**. JFCs may establish and task their staff to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize **joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs)**.

If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a comprised of representatives from the staff, all components and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to ensure target priorities and other targeting guidance are linked with the JFC's objectives and focused on achieving the JFC's desired effects. Briefings conducted at the JTCB should focus on ensuring that intelligence, operations (by all components and applicable staff elements), and targeting efforts are on track, coordinated, and synchronized.

(b) **Delegation**. JFCs can delegate the authority to conduct targeting execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction to the component level. This process is facilitated by establishing support relationships between subordinate Service or functional component commanders. JFCs utilize the joint targeting process to ensure that this joint effort involves applicable subordinate commands and achieves unity of effort. All components normally are involved in targeting and the JFC should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage and coordinate joint targeting. In some circumstances the JFC may delegate joint targeting functional control responsibilities, to a subordinate component commander. In these cases it is particularly important for a joint targeting mechanism to be established to facilitate the process at this level. A primary consideration when delegating this responsibility is that whoever is designated this responsibility requires sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise.

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.

c. **Air Apportionment**. Air apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. The total expected effort made available to the JFACC is determined by the JFC in consultation with component commanders based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations.

(1) Air apportionment assists JFCs to ensure the weight of the joint force air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives.

(2) Given the many airpower capabilities, its theater-wide application, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another, JFCs pay particular attention to its apportionment. JFCs normally apportion by priority or percentage of effort against assigned mission-type orders and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance, maritime support, and close air support. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes the air apportionment recommendation to the JFC.

(3) Following the JFC's air apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates apportioned air sorties to the functions and/or missions they support.

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

d. **Countering Air and Missile Threats**

(1) Air superiority delivers a fundamental benefit to the joint force. It prevents adversaries from interfering with operations of air, space, or surface forces and assures freedom of action and movement. Control of the air is a critical enabler for the joint force because it allows US forces both freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Using both defensive and offensive operations, the JFC employs complementary weapon systems and sensors to achieve air superiority. These operations not only protect against attack, but also ensure that US forces can strike potential threats prior to launch. Unity of effort is vital for countering threats with an engagement window of perhaps a matter of minutes. In this time-sensitive environment, the JFC must ensure that component systems are integrated and interoperable to achieve air superiority.

(2) **Air superiority** is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both offensive and defensive operations from all components to counter the air and missile threat. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, artillery, SOF, and elements of IO to counter the threat. Joint forces must be integrated to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive operations to destroy, neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats, both before and after launch.

(3) **Defensive Counterair**. As an element of counterair, defensive counterair also contributes to force protection through detecting, identifying, intercepting, and destroying or negating enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment.

(a) **Active Air Defense**. Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons. The JRA coordinator coordinates with the area air defense commander to ensure that air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into air defense plans.

(b) **Passive Air Defense**. Passive air defense includes all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction.

For additional guidance on countering air and missile threats, refer to the JP 3-01 series, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

e. **Space Operations**

(1) **General**. JFCs and their components should request space support early in the planning process to ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. Upon request from a CCDR, subordinate JFC, or theater space LNO, Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), will deploy joint space support teams (JSSTs) to the theater to augment the supported commander's staff to assist in integrating space into the joint campaign. In addition, Commander, USSTRATCOM, may direct space component commanders to provide tailored space support through Service SST personnel to train and/or assist Service forces in theater. JFCs should assign either the Service space experts or SSTs to the component commanders. In the case of the Air Force, space expertise is embedded in each theater staff. Space expertise from the other Services are found in their SSTs. Their primary purpose is to serve as weapons and tactics advisors for space systems (national, civil, commercial, military, and foreign) and for integrating space capabilities into joint force planning and employment. These individuals concentrate primarily on working the detailed activities of theater space operations.

(2) **Theater C2**. A supported JFC normally designates a single authority to coordinate joint theater space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can either retain authority or designate a component commander to coordinate and integrate space operations. The JFC considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities made available, and resident C2 capabilities (including reach-back) in selecting the appropriate option. The **space coordinating authority** is responsible for coordinating and integrating space capabilities, and has primary responsibility for in-theater joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The space coordinating authority normally will be supported by a JSST and coordinates the activities of the component SSTs and/or embedded space operators. While the space coordinating authority may facilitate nontraditional uses of space assets, joint force staffs should utilize established standing operating procedures

(SOPs)/processes when planning traditional space force enhancement missions — ISR; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and navigation and timing. Upon completion of internal coordination, the space coordinating authority provides the JFC a prioritized list of recommended space requirements that support the joint force mission and objectives. Upon JFC approval, the list is submitted to Commander, USSTRATCOM through the supported geographic CCDR. To ensure prompt and timely support, Commander, USSTRATCOM should authorize direct liaison between the space coordinating authority and applicable Service components of USSTRATCOM. This does not restrict joint force Service component commands from communicating requirements directly to their counterpart Service space component commander. However, the space coordinating authority and the Commander, USSTRATCOM must be kept apprised of all such coordination activities to ensure that all space activities are properly integrated and synchronized.[134]

For detailed guidance on incorporating space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

f. **Operational Protection**[135]

(1) Adversaries must never be permitted to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. **Operational protection (also stated as protection of the mission)** enhances freedom of action by reducing the vulnerability of the joint operation mission to hostile acts, influence, and/or surprise through a series of comprehensive and coordinated **offensive and defensive actions and measures** conducted throughout the range of military operations during peacetime, crisis, and war. The purpose and scope is to **preserve the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, and infrastructure deployed or located both within and outside the boundaries of an operational area**. Operational protection integrates key factors not normally linked such as an appropriate military force mix; adequate sustainment; and national diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts.

(2) Operational protection extends beyond DOD concerns (i.e., force protection) to include protection of OGAs, NGOs, international organizations, multinational, and HN personnel, facilities, equipment, and information essential to mission success. Providing operational protection requires significant military, interagency, and multinational coordination at all levels of command. Note: Protection of NGOs and/or international organizations by US military forces may create the undesirable perception that the particular organization is pro-United States. Therefore, NGOs and/or international organizations may refuse to accept US military protection.

(3) The primary elements of operational protection are collecting intelligence for indications and warning; air defense; airspace control; force protection; select IO, protection of the logistic infrastructure and LOCs; defense of the rear area and bases, and combatting terrorism. In a maritime theater, elements of operational protection also include antisubmarine warfare, defense of the coast and coastal waters, surface craft defense, defensive mining, and mine countermeasures. JFCs normally establish an operational protection organization within the joint force headquarters to provide centralized planning and coordination of the various elements, measures, and actions.

(4) **Force Protection**. Force protection includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions **against DOD** personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection is an element of operational protection. It does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk. Elements of force protection include, but are not limited to, the following.

(a) **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense**. Planning for the possibility of enemy WMD use is necessary. It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that represents the greatest effect. It is the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design.[136] NBC defense measures provide defense against attack by WMD and the capability to sustain operations in WMD environments using the principles of avoidance of NBC hazards, particularly contamination; protection of individuals and units from unavoidable WMD hazards; and decontamination.

For additional guidance on NBC defense, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

(b) **Antiterrorism**. Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These measures may include limited response and containment by local military forces. They also consist of defensive measures to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment.

For additional guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

(c) **Defensive IO**. See IO guidance in subparagraph 8a above.

(d) **Security**. Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks and rear areas in the operational area. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control

devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.

(e) **Operations Security**. Effective OPSEC measures minimize the "signature" of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. OPSEC measures are an integral element of IO. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Terrorist activity is discouraged by varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

(f) **Law Enforcement**. Law enforcement aids in force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime. A cooperative police program involving military and civilian and/or HN law enforcement agencies directly contributes to overall force protection.

(g) **Security of High-Risk Personnel**. Security of high-risk personnel (HRP) safeguards designated individuals who, by virtue of their rank, assignment, symbolic value, vulnerabilities, location, or specific threat are at a greater risk than the general population. There are two levels of HRP. Level 1 HRP are those individuals who have such a significantly high potential as terrorist or criminal targets as to warrant assignment of full-time protective services. Level 2 HRP do not warrant full-time protective services but require additional office, residential, and travel security measures. The levels of protection and types of security measures afforded to HRP are determined by threat and vulnerability assessment.

(h) **Personal Security**. Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include

use of individual protective equipment (IPE), use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms.

For additional guidance on force protection-related matters, refer to JPs 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, *and 3-54*, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

(5) **Planning for Operational Protection**

(a) JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address operational protection during all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning. All aspects of operational protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success.

(b) Even in permissive operating environments, operational protection measures will be planned commensurate with the risks to the force. These risks may include a wide range of nonconventional threats such as terrorism, exotic diseases (medical threat), criminal enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Thorough research and detailed information about the operational environment, training, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace will prepare the force for adequate operational protection. The impartiality of the force also may serve as a measure of operational protection. ROE and weapons control policies are important to effective operational protection. In developing these policies, planners take into account the capabilities of the force to avoid situations where policies and capabilities do not match. Measures taken to identify and plan for possible hostile acts against a force can be successful only if the force is given commensurate ROE to protect itself.

(c) The following considerations that contribute to overall operational protection are provided as a guide, requiring adaptation to the mission and situation.

1. **Health, Welfare, and Morale Maintenance**. The JFC must keep personnel healthy and maintain high morale. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. A system must in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine.

2. **Safety** is crucial to successful operations and the preservation of military power. The JFC may reduce the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety planning factors could include the geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards.

3. **Technology** can assist in providing lethal and nonlethal capabilities (e.g., sensors, CID, secure communications network, unmanned aerial vehicles, personnel dye markers, sponge grenades, rubber bullets) that contribute to operational protection. The use of nonlethal weapons should be considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how well the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment. [137]

g. **CA** units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil organizations. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, allied or coalition, HN forces, as well as international organizations and NGOs. CA forces can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to perform functions that normally are the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Selection of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned.[138]

For further guidance on civil affairs, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

h. **Contracting Support**. Providing logistic support may require contracting interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, international organizations and NGOs. Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy or before civil augmentation programs can provide support. Contracting also is valuable when HNS agreements do not exist, or when HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support also is essential. A **contracting support plan** should be developed per the guidance outlined in JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,* to ensure contracting solutions receive consideration during logistic planning and become part of the operation or campaign plan.[139]

i. **Environmental Considerations**. While complete protection of the environment during military operations may not always be possible, careful planning should address environmental considerations in joint operations, to include legal aspects. JFCs are responsible for protecting the environment in which US military forces operate to the greatest extent possible. In this regard, JFCs should be responsible for the following.

(1) Demonstrate proactive environmental leadership during all phases of joint operations across the range of military operations. Instill an environmental ethic in subordinate commands and promote environmental awareness throughout the joint force.

(2) Ensure that environmental considerations are an integral part in the planning and decisionmaking processes. Logistic support should be planned and conducted with appropriate consideration of the environment in accordance with applicable international treaties and conventions, US environmental laws, policies, and regulations and HN agreements. Early planning is essential to ensure that all appropriate environmental reviews have been completed prior to initiating logistic support activities.[140]

(3) Identify specific organizational responsibilities and specific joint force environmental requirements. These responsibilities should have clearly defined goals, strategies, and measures of success.

(4) Ensure compliance, as far as practicable within the confines of mission accomplishment, with all applicable environmental laws and agreements, including those of the HN. The goal of compliance is to minimize potential adverse impacts on human health and the environment while maximizing readiness and operational effectiveness.

(5) **Disposal Considerations**. Disposal is an important link in the overall logistic chain. Planning for disposal must take place from the onset of operations and continue throughout redeployment. Inadequate understanding of disposal operations may cause conflicts with public and international law, confusion over roles and requirements, increased costs, and inefficient operations.[141] Defense Logistics Agency support to the CCDR's Service component commands includes the capability to receive and dispose of materiel in a theater. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service element in theater establishes theater-specific procedures for the reuse, demilitarization, or disposal of facilities, equipment, and supplies, to include hazardous materiel and waste.[142]

For further guidance on disposal operations, refer to JP 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.

j. **Battlespace Communications System Planning**. The BCS provides the JFC the means to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect information. The mission and structure of the joint force determine specific information flow and processing requirements. In turn, the information requirements dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the BCS. Therefore, BCS planning needs to be integrated and

synchronized with operational planning. Through effective BCS planning, the JFC is able to apply capabilities at the critical time and place for mission success.

(1) **The BCS must be planned with unified action in mind and provide communications links to appropriate OGAs, NGOs, and international organizations**. Further, routine communications and backup systems may be disrupted and **civil authorities** might have to rely on available military communications equipment. Additionally, BCS planning must consider the termination of US involvement and procedures to transfer BCS control to another agency such as the UN. Planning should consider that it may be necessary to leave some communications systems behind to continue support of the ongoing effort.[143]

(2) Joint operations typically involve coalition/allied partners; therefore, **interoperability and communications security (COMSEC) planning are critical**. Oftentimes, US forces are assigned to coalition/allied forces to provide secure communications and to protect US COMSEC and crypto devices.[144]

For additional guidance on BCS planning, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine for Battlespace Communications System (BCS) Support to Joint Operations.

k. **Functional Combatant Command Support**. Functional combatant commands provide support to and may be supported by geographic combatant commands and other functional combatant commands as directed by higher authority, normally as indicated in the JSCP and other CJCS-level documents. They also may execute their global responsibilities in a supporting or supported commander role (e.g., strategic transportation, employment against strategic targets, global strike, CNO). The President and Secretary of Defense direct what specific support and to whom such support will be provided from functional combatant commands. When a functional CCDR is the supported commander and operating within a geographic CCDR's AOR, close coordination and communication between the affected combatant commanders is paramount.[145]

l. **Other Considerations**

(1) **Disciplined Operations**. Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by superior commanders. Military strategic and operational objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force.

(a) **Legal Requirements**. Nearly every decision and action has potential legal considerations and implications. The legal implications of displaced and detained civilians, fiscal activities, ROE, international law and agreements, claims, and contingency contracting on joint operations must be considered. Further, HN legal personnel should be integrated into the command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs.[146]

For further information on legal matters, refer to JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations.

(b) Exercising discipline in operations includes **limiting collateral damage** — the inadvertent or secondary damage occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or adversary forces. JFCs apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory against combatants, but are careful to limit unnecessary injury to noncombatants and damage, especially to protected or sacred sites.

(c) **JFC use of force includes the proper treatment of enemy prisoners of war, civilians, and other noncombatants**. Laws of war are intended to reduce casualties and enhance fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike.

(d) **ROE**, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct joint operations, are developed by the Joint Staff and CCDRs and

promulgated by the President and Secretary of Defense. US forces will always comply with the LOAC. In those circumstances when armed conflict, under international law, does not exist, LOAC principles nevertheless may be applied as a matter of national policy. If armed conflict occurs, the actions of US forces will be governed by both the LOAC and ROE. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander's intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of unit and individual self-defense. Properly developed ROE must be clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

For further guidance on ROE, refer to CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, *and JP 5-00.2*, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

(2) **Combat Identification**. CID measures must be established early in the planning cycle, consistent with ROE, and not interfere unduly with unit and individual rights and responsibilities to engage adversary forces. CID considerations play an important role in force protection and must be included in planning CID measures.

For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

(3) **Risk Management** Risk is inherent in military operations. Risk management assists commanders in conserving lives and resources and avoiding unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment. Risk management does not inhibit commanders' flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero defects mindset), require a GO/NO-GO decision, sanction or justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for development of SOPs.[147] Risk management should be applied to all

levels of war and across the range of military operations. In addition, risk management should be applied to all phases of an operation, and should include any branches and sequels to an operation.

(a) In noncombat operations, commanders and their staffs consider a variety of risks — such as the implications of failure to national prestige or to joint force morale, risk to the safety and force protection of individual joint force members, loss of expensive equipment, or damage to the environment.

(b) In combat or potential combat situations, commanders and their staffs carefully identify conditions that constitute success and the associated risk to joint forces — both for the desired end state and for the major operations or stages that lead to that end state. It is for this reason, in part, that an indirect approach to adversary COGs, attacking adversary vulnerabilities rather than strengths, is important in the design of campaigns and operations.[148] To the extent that the desired end state conditions are met, commanders reduce the remaining risk. When these conditions are not met, or only partially met, commanders and their staffs identify the risk associated with continuing. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may apply additional force — by reallocating combat forces or by shifting supporting operations, for example — or they may decide the risk is acceptable.

(c) To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission and/or operational area. Figure III-4 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.

(4) **Rehearsals**. Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting joint forces to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for

subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in integration and synchronization. While rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, the JFC should identify key elements for rehearsal.



Figure III-4. Risk Management Process

(5) **Language Proficiency and Cultural Awareness**. CCDRs are required to anticipate and incorporate their needs for language professionals and regional experts into all operation plans. These plans will include the capacity to surge language enabled personnel and regional experts beyond organic capabilities.

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CHAPTER IV
MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

"Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult."

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

MCO are the most complex and require the greatest planning and effort. The following section discusses those areas that must be considered and addressed when planning and conducting MCO. This is not meant to indicate that these factors should be considered only when action escalates to MCO status. Many of these same factors must be considered for stability operations. These lower intensity operations may be precursors to MCO or, if successful, may forestall escalation to that level.

1. Considerations for Deterrence and Engagement

a. **General**. JFCs are able to take actions before the initiation of hostilities to assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational operations.[149] Considerations include gaining a clear understanding of the national and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; COGs, critical factors, and decisive points; actions likely to achieve those desired effects; and required joint, multinational, and interagency capabilities matched to available forces. The JFC must visualize how these operations can be orchestrated into a campaign and missions that are communicated via commanders intent throughout the force. Emphasis should be placed on setting the conditions for decisive and postconflict operations.[150]

b. **Organizing and Training Forces**. Organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. When it is not possible to

train forces in the theater of employment, as with CONUS-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the CCDR's joint mission essential task list.[151]

c. **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace**

(1) JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies (for example, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. J-2s should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC's intelligence requirements.

(2) At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPB process, JFCs, through early involvement of their Intelligence Directorates (J-2s) in the planning process, focus intelligence efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

For additional guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.

d. **Preparing the Operational Area**

(1) **Special Operations**. SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining a potential adversary's will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multinational, or indigenous/surrogate forces. USSOCOM develops strategy and synchronizes planning and execution of global operations and provides SOF to the geographic CCDRs to conduct preparation of the operational area.[152]

(2) **Maintaining Operational Area Access**. JFCs establish and maintain access to operational areas in which they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing, freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. Supporting CCDRs can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

(3) **Stability Operations**. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for postconflict operations that seek to secure national strategic objectives. The objectives are to begin shaping the postconflict environment and to anticipate and provide for all the needs involved in filling the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations are terminated. Accomplishing these should ease transitioning to postconflict operations and shorten the path to the desired end state and handover to another authority. Considerations include limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services, disposition

of captured leadership and demobilized military and paramilitary forces, availability of cash, identifying and managing spoilers, force mix (i.e., combat, military police, CA; multinational), securing adversary ammunition caches and other key infrastructure, law enforcement, health services support (HSS), IO, command structure, support to counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism.

(4) **Logistic Support and Sustainment**. Thorough logistic planning for deployment, distribution, and sustainment during operations is particularly critical. For example, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate.[153] If possible, planning should include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces.

e. The **theater evacuation policy** is set by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the geographic CCDR prior to joint operation execution. It states the maximum number of days (hospitalization and convalescence) a patient may be held in a particular operations zone for treatment prior to onward movement or return to duty. Patients who cannot be returned to duty within the specified number of days are evacuated to the next operations zone for further treatment. The theater evacuation policy, in part, determines how many HSS assets will be deployed to the theater. A short evacuation policy limits the HSS personnel ceiling for the operation and places a heavier reliance on medical evacuation support out of the theater to definitive care facilities in the United States or other designated areas.[154]

For further information on HSS and theater evacuation, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations.

f. **Isolating the Enemy**

(1) With President and Secretary of Defense approval, guidance, and national support; **JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary**. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while

limiting the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs also may be tasked by the President and Secretary of Defense to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.

(2) **The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure**. This isolation is accomplished by PSYOP and by interdicting LOCs and sources of sustaining resources. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

g. **Movement to Attain Operational Reach**

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. At other times, CONUS-based mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.[155]

(2) JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces might even be sufficient to stop adversary aggression or movement.

h. **Operational Protection**. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to accomplish their mission. This protection dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection, but be aware of and participate as appropriate in interagency and

regional multinational activities. JFCs may spend as much time on these efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

i. **Space-Based Capabilities**. JFCs continue to exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities. Space forces are maneuvered or activated as necessary to contribute to a JFC's accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation, as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the CCDR or from higher authority.

j. **Geospatial information and services (GI&S)**. It is essential that maps, charts, and support data (to include datum and coordinate system to be used) are coordinated in advance. The accuracy, scale, and reliability of foreign maps and charts may vary widely from US products. Additionally, in multinational operations release of US mapping materials may require foreign disclosure approval.

For further guidance on GI&S, refer to JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Global Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations.[156]

k. **Physical Environment**

(1) Seasonal terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations and logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during operations. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic studies and long-range forecasts help JFCs understand the most advantageous time and location for operations.

(2) Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. **The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban areas,**

however, is not the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants that fundamentally alters their character.[157] Joint urban operations (JUO) are conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique to clearing adversary forces while possibly restoring services and managing major concentrations of people. During JUO, joint forces may not always focus only on destruction of adversary forces but also may be required to take steps necessary to protect and support noncombatants and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for survival. As such, ROE during JUO may be more restrictive than for other types of operations. When planning JUO, JFCs should consider the impact of military operations on noncombatants and their infrastructure, thereby approaching JUO with a concept that views the urban area as a dynamic entity — not solely as terrain.[158]

For additional guidance on JUO, refer to JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations.[159]

(3) **Maritime and/or Littoral Areas**. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations conducted in the littoral area can facilitate the entry of other elements of the joint force through the seizure of an adversary's port, naval base, or air base to allow entry and movement of other elements of the joint force.[160]

2. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

a. **General**. As operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full-dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt adversaries immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.

b. **Force Projection**

(1) The President and Secretary of Defense may direct CCDRs to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces and appropriate flexible deterrent options to preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not sufficient, strikes and/or the **deployment** of forces from CONUS or another theater may be necessary. Consequently, JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. CCDRs should not overlook enemy capabilities to affect deployment from bases to ports of embarkation. The deployment of forces may be either opposed or unopposed by an adversary.[161]

(a) **Opposed**. When the adversary can limit the deployment of friendly forces, initial operations may be designed to suppress these anti-access capabilities. For example, the ability to generate sufficient combat power through long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.[162] Other opposed situations may require a viable forcible entry capability (see subparagraph 2c below) with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry.[163] In other cases, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces.[164] For example, seizure and defense of lodgment areas by amphibious forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of pre-positioned forces and materiel into the theater. Both efforts demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.[165]

(b) **Unopposed** deployment operations may afford an opportunity, following arrival in the operational area, to continue to build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces that best facilitates the buildup of forces necessary for the envisioned operations. Logistic capability may be a higher

priority than combat capability, which could be initially limited to that needed for protection.

Battle groups and task forces deployed worldwide provide combat power from the sea able to respond rapidly to crisis situations.

(2) Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and force protection requirements prior to deployment and upon arrival in the operational area. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation.[166]

(3) During force projection, US forces and ports of debarkation often will be friendly decisive points that must be protected. JFCs introduce forces in a manner that provides operational protection while enabling rapid force buildup. From a C2 perspective, echelon is essential.[167] Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats. Early entry forces also should include the C2 capability to rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.[168]

c. **Unit Integrity During Deployment**

(1) US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue to operate under established procedures, adapting them to the mission and situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness may be decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force takes more time to gel and adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only complicates mission accomplishment, but may also have an impact on force protection.

(2) Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal procedures and structures, and have trained and operated together. Additionally, when deploying into a situation that may involve combat operations, commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capabilities, including elements that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures. In order to provide a JFC with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve complete unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements that are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. Units not accustomed to having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic support to normally unrelated units.[169]

d. **Forcible entry** is a joint military operation conducted either as a major operation or a part of a larger campaign to introduce combat forces rapidly into the territory of an adversary with the expectation of facing armed opposition. A joint forcible entry operation is tailored to accomplish the mission and achieve desired effects. Three types of joint entry operations may occur: single lodgment to support follow-on operations; multiple entry points to establish multiple, interconnected and distributed lodgments for a large campaign; and singular insertion without follow-on operations for operations such

as strikes, raids or evacuation. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at the enemy COGs and can open new avenues for other military operations.[170]

(1) Forcible entry operations may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. The size and composition of the joint forcible entry force will vary depending upon the operational requirements.[171] Forcible entry operations can create multiple dilemmas for the adversary by creating threats that exceed his capability to respond. The joint forcible entry operation commander will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelms the adversary and achieves the desired effects before the adversary has time to react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat any adversary reaction when it does occur and facilitate follow-on operations, if required.[172]

(2) **Forcible entry normally is complex and risky** and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of command is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust BCS and intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements.[173]

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander, US Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from continental United States bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large

formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

VARIOUS SOURCES[174]

(3) **The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on operations and should incorporate these operations throughout planning**. Joint forcible entry actions occur in both singular and multiple operations. These actions include: establishing forward presence, preparing the operational area, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access, receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting decisive operations.[175]

(4) **OPSEC and MILDEC are critical to successful forcible entry**. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with SO. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval surface fire support and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.[176]

(5) **SOF may precede forcible entry forces** to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.[177]

(6) **The sustainment requirements and challenges** for forcible entry operations **can be formidable**, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.[178]

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.

e. **Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity**. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using land, sea, air, space, information, or SO forces and capabilities. These attacks may be decisive, but if they are not, they may begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy's depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.[179]

f. **Dimensional Superiority** — the cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information domains that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference — is essential to joint force mission success. JFCs seek superiority in these domains to prepare the operational area and environment and to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. The JFC may have to initially focus all available joint forces on seizing the initiative. A delay at the outset of combat may lead to lost coalition support and credibility and incentives for other adversaries to begin conflicts elsewhere. This initial focus will be much more effective with dimensional superiority, but may very well have to be executed before that is achieved.

(1) **JFCs normally strive to achieve air and sea superiority early**. Air superiority allows joint forces to conduct operations without prohibitive interference from enemy air or missile attacks. Sea superiority facilitates rapid deployment of joint force personnel, equipment, and supplies. History has shown that the establishment of air and sea superiority can be pivotal factors to mission success. For example, air superiority

(Operation POINT BLANK) and control of the English Channel were considered prerequisites to the success of the World War II Allied landings at Normandy.

(2) **Land forces** can move quickly into an area to deter the enemy from inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. Through the conduct of sustained operations, land forces can control people and land, contribute to defeat of an adversary, and establish postconflict stability.

(3) **Space superiority must be achieved early to ensure freedom of action**. Space superiority allows the JFC access to communications, weather, and intelligence assets while denying the enemy use of space-based resources. Space control operations are conducted by joint and allied and/or coalition forces to gain and maintain space superiority. Direct in-theater space support is provided by resident theater and Service-specific space weapons officers and technicians, in addition to JSSTs from USSTRATCOM.[180]

(4) Early **superiority in the electromagnetic, and information domains** also is vital in joint operations. **It degrades the enemy's C2 while allowing the JFC to maximize friendly C2 capabilities**. Superiority in the electromagnetic and information domains also allows the JFC to better understand the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and actions and influence foreign attitudes and perceptions of the operation.

(5) **Decision Superiority**. The ability of the JFC to achieve decision superiority—to make effective decisions more rapidly than the adversary, thereby allowing a dramatic increase in the pace, coherence, and effectiveness of operations—is based upon information superiority and battlespace awareness. Information superiority and battlespace awareness are made possible to a large degree through IA—ensuring the integrity of information—and knowledge management (KM), which seeks to provide the right information to the right people at the right time in the right understandable/actionable format or display. Further, the collaborative information environment is a key enabler for KM.[181]

g. **Operations and C2 in the Littoral Areas**

(1) **Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations**, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces' relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces' very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.[182]

Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint force commanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.[183]

(2) **JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea**. Depending on the nature of the joint operation, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC while the operation is primarily maritime, and shift that command ashore if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC's concept of operations. In other cases, a naval headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFC may use the BCS and intelligence facilities aboard ship. Naval air and missile defense can project that coverage inland, during both entry operations and sustained operations ashore.[184]

(3) **Transferring C2 from sea to shore** requires detailed planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force to maintain uninterrupted C2 for current operations. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training in this transition is evident.[185]

h. **SOF-Conventional Force Integration**. The JFC; using SOF independently or integrated with conventional air, ground, and naval forces; gains an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives that might not otherwise be attainable. Integration enables the JFC to take fullest advantage of Service and SOF core competencies. SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is through proper SOF C2 elements responsive to the needs of the supported commander. Such SOF C2 elements are provided to supported or supporting conventional force commanders and include joint special operations task forces to conduct a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign, SO C2 elements to synchronize integrated SOF/conventional force operations, and SO liaison elements to coordinate SO with conventional air operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force liaison officers is also essential to enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff planning of and training for integrated operations.[186]

"SOF and conventional forces integration demonstrated powerful air-ground synergies in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF). SOF, while performing the classic special operations core task of unconventional warfare, organized and coordinated operations of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, and frequently called massive and effective close air support from Air Force and Navy assets. The effects of the continuous SOF directed air strikes so weakened the Taliban and al Qaeda that the Northern Alliance was able to quickly capture the major cities of Afghanistan early in the campaign."

Various Sources

i. **Stability Operations**. The onset of combat provides an opportunity to shape and prepare for postconflict operations. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential spoilers may be initiated. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. IO aimed at informing the population and enemy forces of US goals and joint force intentions can ease the situation encountered during postconflict operations.

j. **Operational Protection**. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure and logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the force must be protected.

(1) **Protection from the Enemy's Fires and Maneuver**. JFCs counter the enemy's fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and fires, including the effects of WMD. OPSEC and MILDEC are key elements of this effort. Air, space, and maritime superiority operations; defensive IO; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment also contribute significantly to force protection at the onset of combat operations.

(2) **Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance**. Personnel health is key to maintaining their fighting spirit. JFCs ensure that force health protection systems are in place for delivery of comprehensive medical care through joint coordination and planning, rapid and scaleable response capabilities, mutually supportive medical operations, early warning of health protection hazards, and programs designed to optimize human performance and the fighting strength of the joint force. JFC's will plan for the quick return of minor casualties to duty and the evacuation of seriously injured for follow-on care.[187]

For further guidance on health maintenance, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

(3) **Safety**. JFCs must make safety an integral part of joint training, but also joint operations. High-tempo operations increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Therefore, safety is a key element in the preservation of combat power. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks.

(4) **Prevention of Fratricide**. JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for reducing fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners, SOPs, technology solutions, rehearsals, and enhanced battlespace awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize fratricide while not limiting boldness and initiative in combat.

3. Considerations for Decisive Operations

a. **General**. JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a "coup de main" is not possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. The JFC may designate one component or line of operation to be the main effort, with others providing assets in support, or the JFC may have a main effort with other components and functions performing operations in their own mission areas. When conditions or plans change, the main effort and focus of the operation might shift to another component or function. Some functions, like joint strategic attack, interdiction, and PSYOP, continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action or informational advantage. These functions, when executed concurrently with other main operations, degrade enemy morale and physical

cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

b. **The Relationship Between Offense and Defense**

(1) Although defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve military strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, JFCs normally will seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations.

(2) Joint operations normally will include elements of both offense and defense. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. To conduct such operations, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. During sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures throughout the campaign. Forces at all levels within the joint force must possess the agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa.

(3) The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. Defensive operations, where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

c. **Linear and Nonlinear Operations**

(1) **In linear operations**, each commander directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. **Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward lines of own**

troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods. A linear operational area organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations also are appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily. Coalition operations also may require a linear design. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.[188]

(2) **In nonlinear operations**, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points. **Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations from selected bases (ashore or afloat)**. Simultaneity overwhelms opposing C2 and retains the initiative. LOCs often diverge from lines of operations, and sustaining functions may depend on sustainment moving with forces and/or aerial delivery. Situational understanding, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders. Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. The joint forces oriented more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves, individual forces relied more on battlespace awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the BCS, intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.[189]

(3) **Nonlinear Situations**. JFC may conduct nonlinear offensive and defensive operations in contiguous and noncontiguous areas. Stability operations usually are nonlinear and noncontiguous.

(a) During **nonlinear offensive operations**, attacking forces must focus offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum essential combat power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility. Joint forces conducting nonlinear operations require robust communications and sustainment capabilities. JFCs may be required to dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and base defense. Vulnerability increases as operations extend and attacking forces are exposed over a larger operational area. Linkup operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require extensive planning and preparation. The potential for fratricide increases due to the fluid nature of the nonlinear battlespace and the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces. The presence of noncombatants in the operational area further complicates operations.[190]

(b) During **nonlinear defensive operations**, defenders focus on destroying enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFCs intent and maintain a COP. Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some subordinate units may conduct area defenses to hold key terrain or canalize attackers into engagement areas. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining large areas due to the size of the operational area. Joint forces conducting nonlinear defenses require robust communications and sustainment capabilities. Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear defensive operations require careful judgment in clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Although less challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment

security will still be a test and may require allocation of combat forces to protect LOC and other high risk functions or bases.[191]

(c) **Nonlinear Stability Operations**. The greatest risk to friendly forces may occur when conducting sustainment actions outside well defended bases. In these situations, the JFC and component commanders should treat these sustainment actions as combat operations. Most importantly, the JFC must ensure that clear command relationships are established to properly account for the added challenges to base, base cluster, and LOC security.[192]

d. **Air, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information superiority** allow JFCs additional opportunities to conduct sustained operations with more operational and logistic flexibility. In addition; air, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information superiority may contribute significantly to both adequate logistic buildup and operational protection in the operational area.

e. **Operating in the Littoral Areas**. Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to achieving operational objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.[193]

f. **Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity**. The attack of enemy COGs typically continue during sustained operations. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy COGs should be designed to achieve the military strategic and operational objectives per the concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on postconflict operations.

g. **Joint Strategic Attack**. The CCDR should consider conducting joint strategic attacks, including global strike, when feasible. A joint strategic attack is a CCDR directed offensive action against a vital target(s), whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary's ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed the President and Secretary of Defense. Additionally, these attacks may directly or indirectly achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. These targets may include but are not limited to enemy strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct joint strategic attacks. The CCDR's staff and component staffs propose targets and plans for conducting joint strategic attacks for the CCDR's approval.[194]

h. **Maneuver** of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC's campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver also may exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower.[195]

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the adversary in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. The focus of is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, airspace, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions) through air, land, and naval maneuvers.

(2) There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of an enemy's COG, has positional advantage. In

like manner, land and air expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy's COG and have the means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

(3) JFCs consider the contribution of SO in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

i. **Interdiction**

(1) Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. The JFACC is responsible for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort, while land and naval component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

(2) Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real-time and near-real-time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

(3) Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing land and naval forces and the conduct of counterair operations as part of the overall amphibious plan.

For more guidance on joint interdiction operations, refer to JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.

BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA
2-4 March 1943

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application of firepower at the operational level — in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establish a line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea, through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau, New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command at Rabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea. Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and 8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departed Rabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identified the likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney's Allied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forward positioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.

Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northern coast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney's air forces attacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formations of B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damaging several others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney's Papuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In a synchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12 A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashed their firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continued throughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runways to join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and, except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking, or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boats finished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, "Our decisive success cannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy's strategic and tactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completely dislocated." Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, still regarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as "the decisive aerial engagement" of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked and aborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relying on Kenney's aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact of interdiction on a theater campaign.

VARIOUS SOURCES[196]

j. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction

(1) Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction and maneuver (air, land, and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the military strategic and

operational objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to integrated and synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When interdiction and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully balance imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of interdiction and maneuver forces and the undesirability of fragmenting joint force air assets. The JFC's objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements often will exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities and the responsibilities and authority assigned and delegated to commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater and/or JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing military strategic objectives. The operation concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate

command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

(3) JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).[197] Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly surface forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy's rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat, which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to surface maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

(4) JFCs must synchronize and integrate maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize and integrate maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

(5) All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving the strategic and operational objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as military deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction.

(6) Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC's scheme of maneuver. JFCs need to properly synchronize and integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

(7) Within the joint force operational area, all joint force component operations must contribute to attainment of the JFC's objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish AOs within their operational area. **Synchronization and/or integration of maneuver and interdiction within land or naval AOs is of particular importance**, particularly when JFCs task component commanders to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions.

(a) Air, land, and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on air, land, and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

(b) JFCs may establish land and naval force AOs to prevent interference between component operations. The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commanders' requirements to accomplish their missions, and protect their forces. This facilitates rapid maneuver and ability to fight at extended ranges. **Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction**. To facilitate this, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

(c) The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that employ interdiction forces within the supported commander's AO. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders normally can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.[198] However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

(d) Joint force operations in maritime and/or littoral areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

(8) Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater and/or JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater- and/or JOA-wide air interdiction effort.

(9) JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike

with organic assets within their AOs that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to a desired effect and/or time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or naval forces.

k. **Joint Fires**. Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters.[199] Joint fires and joint fire support may include, but are not limited to, the lethal effects of close air support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire support, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects such as those produced through EW. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the supported force is essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

l. **Operations When WMD are Employed**

(1) **Enemy Employment**. An enemy's use of WMD can quickly change the nature of a campaign. The use or the threat of use of these weapons can cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs.[200] Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other alliance or coalition members, especially those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance or coalition.[201]

(a) Intelligence systems and planners advise JFCs of an opponent's capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that opponent is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy's willingness and intent to employ

these weapons. It is important to ensure that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.[202]

(b) Operational protection is imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion of forces, use of IPE, and proper use of terrain for shielding against blast and radiation effects. Enhancement of NBC defense capabilities reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with WMD.[203]

(c) The effective combination of conventional offensive and defensive operations can help reduce the effectiveness or success of an enemy's use of WMD. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. JFCs implement defensive NBC measures and plan for effective air and theater missile defense with different systems.[204]

For additional guidance on defensive NBC measures, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.[205]

(2) When directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, CCDRs plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is a Presidential decision. The Commander, USSTRATCOM's capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.[206] If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives.[207]

(a) The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using PSYOP or other means. Regardless, JFCs implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond,

including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Attempts at prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and unconventional (e.g., IO and SO) forces.[208]

(b) If deterrence fails, JFCs respond appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response could be conventional in nature, but may include the employment of nuclear weapons.[209]

For additional guidance on employment of nuclear weapons, refer to the JP 3-12 series.[210]

m. **Sustainment**. Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the desired end state. Sustainment plays a key role in both offensive and defensive combat operations. JFCs normally seek to begin building sustainment capabilities during the earliest phases of a campaign or operation. As with achieving dimensional superiority, sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop any required branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required.

n. **Campaign Assessment**

(1) With the increasing complexity and the accompanying uncertainty of modern conflict, traditional battle damage assessment (BDA) is not sufficient. A more comprehensive **campaign assessment determines the overall effectiveness and efficiency of force employment during a military campaign**. Campaign assessment is composed of four interrelated components: effects assessment, BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and future targeting or reattack recommendations. **Effects Assessment** focuses on measuring achievement of operational and strategic effects while **BDA** focuses primarily on tactical-level actions. Campaign assessment requires constant collaboration and information flow from all sources and should support

all sections of the joint force headquarters staff and components.[211]

(2) At the JFC level, campaign assessment should be a joint effort designed to determine if **the joint force is achieving the desired effects in the battlespace as envisioned in the commander's intent, concept, and accompanying orders.** The aim is to analyze with sound military judgment the progress toward the desired end state—the intended state of the battlespace when operations conclude. Campaign assessment requires appropriate types of measurement, such as **measures of performance (MOP)** and **measures of effectiveness (MOE)**, that provide feedback on results or effects attainment. These help the JFC and staff measure success of tactical and operational tasks as well as assess attainment of operational and strategic effects and can give the JFC staff and components an appreciation of the causal linkage between specific tasks and desired effects. Useful MOP, MOE, and other measures should be able to be expressed numerically, to show a trend, and to show progress relative to a specified threshold of success.[212]

(3) **Campaign assessment measures physical and behavioral changes in an adversary's systems**. **BDA** typically focuses on physical changes such as destruction of specific targets. **Effects Assessment** usually assesses impact of friendly actions on the functioning of systems that relate directly to the adversary's employment of his military capability such as C2, offense, defense, protection, logistics, and infrastructure (e.g., power, water, LOCs).[213]

(4) **Campaign assessment is done at all levels in the joint force**. **JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the campaign assessment intelligence effort** that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. Joint force components identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support campaign assessment for all components. The JFC also must plan for using effects assessment assets to assess the impact of friendly diplomatic, informational, and economic actions against the full range of adversary political, military, economic, social,

information, and infrastructure (aka PMESII) systems when required. Therefore, joint ISR assets must be developed, allocated, apportioned, and assigned to detect strategic and operational system behavioral effects not addressed in traditional BDA. Normally, the **joint force J-3, assisted by the J-2, will be responsible for coordinating campaign assessment**.[214]

4. Considerations for Transition

a. **General**. Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to another authority and redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. These "postconflict operations" illustrated in Figure IV-1 ensure the desired end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Postconflict operations typically begin with significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.[215] As postconflict operations progress, military forces may be largely in support of other US and international agency efforts.[216] Ideally, the joint operation will be terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met, which assumes those objectives accounted for the total military effort towards the desired end state. In many cases, it may become apparent that those objectives fall short of the military contribution to the desired end state. This situation may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of "mission creep;" or the postconflict operations in support of US diplomatic, multinational alliance/coalition, or international organization efforts.



Figure IV-1. Postconflict Operations

b. **The JFC may need to realign forces or adjust force structure** to begin postconflict operations in some portions of the operational area even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. Planning and continuous development of the estimate of the situation will reveal the nature and scope of these activities and the forces required. These forces may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from the RC.[217]

c. **Stability Operations**

(1) Planning for postconflict stability operations should not be delayed or deferred when joint operation planning is initiated. Further, an uneven focus on planning the decisive operations phase may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for the transition phase and ultimately joint operation momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish peace and normalcy as succeeding areas are occupied. As sustained combat operations near termination, military forces must refocus their priority once again on stability operations, which likely will involve both combat and noncombat. Refugee control, reestablishing civil law and order, protecting key infrastructure, restoring public services, medical assistance, IO, and other tasks may be done best by military forces during this inevitably turbulent period. During this time of military occupation/presence, joint forces may be

required to conduct PO, counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism and counterterrorism, CMO, nation assistance, FHA, arms control, enforcement of sanctions, and strikes and raids among other possibilities.[218]

(2) The military's presence and its ability to operate in crisis environments and under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies. Nevertheless, some stability operations likely will be in support of US diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts. Military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly subordinating military forces to the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting postconflict operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of governmental agencies, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Typical military support includes, but are not limited to, the following.[219]

(a) **SOF** support to reestablish a civil government (i.e., CA), additional training for HN armed forces, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and intelligence gathering.[220]

(b) **CI activities** to safeguard EEFI. This is particularly pertinent in countering belligerent human intelligence (HUMINT) efforts. Members of NGOs and international organizations working closely with US forces may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with stability operations. Members of the local populace often gain access to US military personnel and their bases by providing services such as laundry and cooking and provide information gleaned from that interaction to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents. The JFC must consider these and similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to counter potential compromise. CI personnel develop an estimate of the threat and recommend appropriate actions.[221]

(c) **PA operations** to provide command information programs, media support, and international information programs.[222]

(3) During postconflict stability operations, **operational protection** from virtually any person, element, or group hostile to US interests must be considered. These could include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will have to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a WMD incident. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. **Operational protection likely will involve the security of members from OGAs, NGOs, and international organizations as well as contractors**. Inherent in operational protection is the need to be capable of rapid transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise.

(4) The inherent **right of self-defense** from the unit to the individual level applies here as well. Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk. **JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation**. However, security requirements should be balanced with the operation's nature and objectives. In some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and flak vests, or using secure communications may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force's legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

(5) **Restraint**. During postconflict operations, military capability must be applied even more prudently. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including **specific ROE**. These ROE often will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in sustained combat operations. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual

Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences.[223]

(6) **Perseverance**. Some transition phases may be short, others may require years to achieve the desired end state. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of end state conditions for as long as necessary to achieve them often is the requirement for success.

(7) **Legitimacy**. Joint stability operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Effective IO can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.[224]

(8) **OPSEC**. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part of stability operations. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

d. **Transfer to Another Authority**. In many cases, the United States will transfer responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint and/or multinational stability operations as described above. Overall, transfer likely will occur in stages—HN sovereignty, peace operations under UN mandate, termination of all US military participation. Joint force support to this effort may include the following:

(1) **Support to Truce Negotiations**. This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguistics for all participants.[225]

(2) **Transition to Civil Authorities**. This transaction could be to local or HN federal governments, to a UN peacekeeping operation after peace enforcement operations, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a NGO in support of refugees.[226]

e. **Redeployment**

(1) **Conduct**. Redeployment normally is conducted as needed in stages — the entire joint force likely will not redeploy in one relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of contracting and other financial obligations, disposition of contracting records and files, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.[227]

(2) **Redeployment to Other Contingencies**. Forces deployed may be called upon to rapidly redeploy to another theater. Planners should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intra- and intertheater airlift, and some consideration to achieving the national strategic objectives of the original contingency through other means.[228]

For further guidance on considerations for termination and postconflict operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

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CHAPTER V
STABILITY OPERATIONS

SECTION A. OVERVIEW

1. General

a. **Scope**. **Stability operations include** specific types of developmental, cooperative, or coercive **security cooperation and deterrence activities** and **small-scale operations (SSO)** and/or missions that promote local or regional normalcy and protect US interests abroad. Stability operations may be conducted in all operational environments and during all phases of a campaign or major operation.

(1) **Security cooperation and deterrence** encompasses a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support the diplomatic instrument or OGAs and cooperate with international authorities (i.e., UN) and other countries to enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These operations usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces and capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, NGOs, and international organizations in a complementary fashion. Because the Department of State frequently is the LFA and nearly always is a principal player in security cooperation and deterrence activities, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Military planners should establish contact with pertinent OGAs, NGOs, and/or international organizations to ensure coordinated efforts.

(2) **SSO** are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an operational area. SSO may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis (e.g., NEOs) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex campaign or operation. SSO may be conducted to accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives. SSO are executed in accordance with a common plan under a common commander.

b. **Political Aspects**. Two important factors about political primacy in stability operations stand out. **First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of all actions**. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant political implications. **Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations**. These changes may not always be obvious. Therefore, commanders must strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes, which over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

SECTION B. SECURITY COOPERATION AND DETERRENCE

2. General

a. **Engagement**. CCDRs shape their AORs through theater security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. TSCPs provide frameworks within which combatant commands engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, theater security cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention. Developmental actions enhance a host government's willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply carefully prescribed force or the threat of force to change the security environment.[229]

b. **Presence and Deterrence**. Sustained joint force presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can flourish. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. Joint forces are the cornerstone of theater deterrence. The sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible

sign of US commitment — to allies and adversaries alike. However, if deterrence fails, committed forces must be agile enough to rapidly transition to combat operations. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional forces deploy.[230]

(1) **Forward presence** activities demonstrate our **commitment**, lend **credibility** to our alliances, enhance **regional stability**, and provide a **crisis response** capability while promoting **US influence and access**. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence involves periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first that a combatant commander commits when responding to a crisis.[231]

(2) **Deterrence**. At all times of peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Although the threat of nuclear war has diminished, proliferation of WMD and conventional advanced technology weaponry is continuing. Threats directed against the United States, allies, or other friendly nations — including terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) — require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Various joint operations (show of force, enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary. Others (nation assistance, FHA) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.[232]

c. **Response**. When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability. Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, is an example. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective intervention also can deny adversaries time to set conditions in their favor or accomplish destabilizing objectives. Deploying a credible force rapidly is the initial step in precluding or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful preclusion involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive operations.[233]

3. Types

a. **Arms Control** is a concept that connotes a plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon an international agreement. Arms control governs any aspect of the following: **the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems** (including the C2, logistic support arrangements, and any related intelligence gathering mechanisms); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament). Additionally, it may connote those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. **Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role**. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material. An equally important involvement might be the monitoring of an arms control agreement using passive and covert use of space-based systems. **All of these actions help reduce threats to regional security**. Other examples include military support for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty by conducting and hosting site inspections, participating in military data exchanges, and implementing armament

reductions. Finally, the US military's implementation of Vienna Document 1992 confidence and security building measures such as unit/formation inspections, exercise notifications/observations, air and ground base visits, and military equipment demonstrations are further examples of arms control.[234]

b. **Combatting terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat exists**. It includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries. **The Department of Defense provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to LFAs**.[235]

(1) **Antiterrorism** involves defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for effectively combatting terrorism. The basics of such programs include training and defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, the mission, infrastructure, and available manpower and resources. The Department of Defense provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to LFAs. The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries under the provisions of title 22, USC (under Antiterrorism Assistance).[236]

"Sec. 2349aa-1. – Purposes. Activities conducted under this part shall be designed -

(1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and counter terrorism;

(2) to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly governments by offering concrete assistance in this area of great mutual concern; and

(3) to increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques."

Title 22, US Code, Chapter 32, Subchapter II, Part VIII, Antiterrorism Assistance[237]

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.[238]

(2) **Counterterrorism** provides response measures that **include operations to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.** Normally, counterterrorism operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. Counterterrorism is primarily a SO mission. The Department of State is the LFA for incidents that take place **outside the United States**. The Department of Justice is the LFA for incidents that occur **within the United States**; and the Department of Transportation is the LFA for incidents **aboard aircraft** "in flight" within the special jurisdiction of the United States. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on LFA designations or responsibilities.[239]

For further details concerning counterterrorism and SO, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. *For US Policy on Counterterrorism, refer to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39*.[240]

c. **DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations**. In counterdrug operations, the Department of Defense supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their effort to **disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs into the United States**. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to the Department of Defense as follows:[241]

(1) **Act as the LFA for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States** by emphasizing activities in cocaine source countries, streamlining activities in the transit zone, and re-focusing activities inside the United States to concentrate on the cocaine threat at critical border locations. The US Coast Guard is the LFA for maritime interdiction of illegal drugs on the high seas and in US territorial waters. The US Customs Service has identical jurisdiction in US territorial waters and is the LFA at US ports of entry.)[242]

(2) **Integrate the BCS and technical intelligence network assets** of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States.[243]

(3) **Approve and fund state plans for expanded use of the National Guard** to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of law enforcement agencies. In addition, the 1993 DOD Authorization Act added the authority for the Department of Defense to **detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of certain surface traffic** within 25 miles of the US boundary. Other DOD support to the National Drug Control Strategy includes **support to law enforcement agencies** (federal, state, and local) **and cooperative foreign governments** by providing intelligence analysts and logistical support personnel; support to interdiction; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; and research and development.[244]

JTF-6

An example of Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations was the establishment of JTF-6 in 1989. Its mission originally focused exclusively along the Southwest border of the United States. A succession of National Defense Authorization Acts expanded the JTF-6 charter by adding specific mission tasks for the organization. In 1995, the JTF-6 area of responsibility expanded to include the entire continental United States

Mission: JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates Department of Defense operational, training and intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug efforts in the continental United States to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States.

Various Sources

For additional guidance on counterdrug operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.[245]

d. **Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime Interception Operations (MIO)** are operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. MIO are a form of maritime interdiction that may include seaborne coercive enforcement measures. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The **political**

objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the military objective focuses on establishing a barrier that is selective, allowing only authorized goods to enter or exit. Depending on the geography, **sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces**. Assigned forces should be capable of **complementary mutual support** and **full communications compatibility**.[246]

MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Maritime Intercept(ion) Operations were conducted to enforces United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) imposed against Iraq in August 1990 in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The United Nations prohibited cargo originating from Iraq and any imports not accompanied by a UN authorization letter. Although, under the food for oil agreement, Iraq could sell oil and import approved goods into Iraq. The enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq was a multinational operation. Ships from 15 countries, and members of the US Coast Guard served together to help enforce these sanctions. UN Sanctions Resolutions were: UNSCR 661 (established economic embargo), UNSCR 665 (called for naval forces to enforce the embargo), UNSCR 687 (Gulf War cease-fire; authorized shipment of food, medical supplies, UN approved goods), and UNSCR 986 (oil for food deal).[247]

VARIOUS SOURCES

Service Members Participating in Maritime Intercept(ion) Operations[248]

e. **Enforcing Exclusion Zones**. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to **prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area**. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land (no-drive zones). Its purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions or threat or use of force. **Such measures usually are imposed by the UN** or another international body, of which the United States is a member, although they may be imposed unilaterally by the United States. Exclusion zones usually are imposed due to **breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant violations of international law** regarding the conduct of states. Situations that may warrant such action include the **persecution of the civil population by a government**, and **efforts to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force**. Sanctions may create economic, political, military, or other conditions where the intent is to change the behavior of the offending nation. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in August 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March 1993 to December 1995 are examples of enforcement of exclusion zones.[249]

f. **Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight**. These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right accorded by international law.[250]

(1) International law has long recognized that **a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea** in the same manner that it can exercise sovereignty over its own land territory. **International law accords the right of "innocent" passage to ships of other nations through a state's territorial waters**. Passage is "innocent" as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.[251]

(2) **Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace** is a well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international

norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. The **International Civil Aviation Organization** develops these norms. The Berlin air corridors, established between 1948 and 1990, which allowed air access to West Berlin, are example actions taken to maintain international airspace to an "air-locked" geographical area. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT series of operations against Libya in 1986 are examples of freedom of navigation operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.[252]

g. **Nation Assistance** is **civil or military assistance** (other than FHA) **rendered to a nation by US forces** within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. **Nation assistance operations support the HN** by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. **The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.** Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). All nation assistance actions are integrated into the US Ambassador's Country Plan.[253]

(1) **Security Assistance** refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some **examples of US security assistance programs** are the Foreign Military Sales Program, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International Military Education and Training Program, the Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. **Security assistance surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services** when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. Security assistance surges are **military in nature** and are focused on providing additional combat systems (weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of security assistance, to include financial and training support.

(2) **FID** programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, informational, and

military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping a nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow its lawful government. US FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including direct support and combat operations as authorized by the Secretary of Defense, to HN forces in executing an IDAD program. FID is a principal special operations mission. An example of nation assistance was Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense. *For further guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JPs 3-05*, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, *and 3-05.1*, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

"The severity of human suffering in Somalia caused commanders to try to alleviate the situation on their own. Units were deployed to the field to provide security for the humanitarian relief agency convoys of food. Upon seeing the appalling conditions, and realizing they were not tasked to give food or provide direct support to the population, local commanders took it upon themselves to try to arrange for or speed up relief supplies. While well-intended, this activity diverted the commanders' attention from their primary mission."

Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, 93-8.

(3) **Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA)** programs are governed by title 10, USC, section 401. This assistance may be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, HCA programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories.

(a) **Medical, dental, and veterinary care** provided in rural areas of a country.

(b) Construction and repair of basic **surface transportation systems**.

(c) **Well drilling** and construction of basic **sanitation facilities**.

(d) Rudimentary construction and repair of **public facilities** such as schools, health and welfare clinics, and other nongovernmental buildings.

h. **FHA operations relieve or reduce the impact of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions** such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance.[254] The Department of Defense provides assistance when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond. See Figure V-1.

(1) The US military is capable of rapidly responding to emergencies or disasters and restoring relative order in austere locations. US forces may provide logistics, HSS, and the planning and BCS required to initiate and sustain FHA operations.

(2) FHA operations may be directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the United States, or when the Secretary of Defense deems the humanitarian situation itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. **The Department of State or the in-country US Ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires FHA.** Within

the Department of Defense, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing the military policy for international FHA operations.

Figure V-1. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance[255]

(3) **FHA operations may cover a broad range of missions and include securing** an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed. US military forces participate in **three basic types of FHA operations** — those coordinated by the UN, those where the United States acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the United States responds unilaterally.

For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.[256]

OPERATION SEA ANGEL

Between 10 May and 13 June 1991 Joint Task Force Sea Angel, under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Okinawa, was sent to the aid of the people of Bangladesh in the wake of the destruction of the tropical cyclone Marian. Cyclone Marian (29-30 April 1991) was one of the most catastrophic natural disasters in recent times. Marian's 140 mile-per-hour winds and an eight-meter tidal wave devastated Bangladesh, killing nearly 140,000 people and leaving over 5 million people homeless. Within 24 hours of a request for support from the government of Bangladesh, Operation SEA ANGEL was launched, and advance teams from the III Marine Expeditionary Force arrive in country for initial liaison.

Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole began an assessment of the situation, and identified three critical concerns: First, the intelligence needed to adequately assess the situation was unavailable; Second, the problem of distribution quickly became apparent, and was considered the most pressing by the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff; Finally, the issue of Bangladeshi sovereignty required that the GOB be clearly viewed by the populace as being "in charge". LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week) entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take complete control of all relief efforts.

Operation SEA ANGEL began on 10 May and involved over 7,000 US soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. A fifteen-ship amphibious task force composed of Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, homeward bound from five months of operations in the Persian Gulf, was diverted to the Bay of Bengal to assist. Over the next month, 6,700 Navy and Marine Corps personnel working with U.S. Army, Air Force, and multinational forces, one of the largest military disaster relief forces ever assembled; provide food, water, and medical care to nearly two million people. The relief efforts of U.S. troops are credited with having saved as many as 200,000 lives.

In the final analysis, Operation Sea Angel proved to be unique in several respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 service members on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; no weapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried by guards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, a unique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize the efforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese non-governmental organizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for International Development (AID) and a Chinese assistance element.

Source: McCarthy, Paul A., "Operation Sea Angel, a Case Study," RAND, 1994.[257]

i. **Protection of Shipping**. When necessary, **US forces provide protection** of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and US property **against unlawful violence in and over international waters**. Operation EARNEST WILL, in which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged under the US flag in 1987, is

an example of an operation to protect shipping. This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law and with the consent of the flag state. Actions to protect shipping include **coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine operations**, and **environmental defense**, in addition to operations on the high seas. Protection of shipping requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base. Protection of shipping may require a combination of operations to be successful:

(1) **Area operations**, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against hostile bases or facilities.

(2) Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by **escort operations**. Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose.

(3) **Mine countermeasures operations** are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations.

(4) **Environmental defense operations** provide for the coordinated US Coast Guard/Department of Defense response to major pollution incidents both at home and overseas. These incidents have the potential for grave damage to natural resources, the economy, and military operations.[258]

j. **Show of Force Operations** are designed to demonstrate US resolve. They involve the **appearance of a credible military force** in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives or to underscore US commitment to an alliance or coalition. As an example, Operation JTF-PHILIPPINES, was conducted by US forces in 1989 in support of

President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. During this operation, a large SO force was formed, fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the coastline of the Philippines

(1) US forces deployed abroad **lend credibility** to US promises and commitments, **increase its regional influence**, and **demonstrate its resolve to use military force** if necessary. In addition, the Secretary of Defense orders a show of force to bolster and reassure friends and allies. **Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes.** These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests as well as international law.

(2) **Political concerns dominate a show of force operation**, and as such, military forces often are under significant legal and political constraints. The military force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. **A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces** including joint US military or multinational forces. Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises.[259]

k. **Support to Counterinsurgency** includes support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. Support to counterinsurgency operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, foreign military financing program, and international military education and training program. Such support also may include FID.[260]

For further guidance on support to counterinsurgency, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.*[261]

l. **Support to Insurgency**. An insurgency is an **organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a legally constituted government** through the use of subversion and

armed action. The United States may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but are not normally involved in the conduct of combat operations. US support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion is an example of support to insurgency.[262]

m. **Consequence Management. CM** involves planning actions and preparations taken to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop and execute plans implemented in response to radiological accidents or accidents involving WMD, as well as the actions taken following such an accident to mitigate and recover from the effect of the accident. CM may be planned and executed for locations within US-owned territory at home and abroad and in foreign countries as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Military support for domestic CM will be provided through Commander, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The Federal Emergency Management Agency is designated the LFA for domestic CM and the Department of State is designated the LFA for foreign CM. US military support to foreign CM normally will be provided to the foreign government through the combatant command within whose AOR the incident occurs.

For further CM guidance, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation; *CJCSI 3214.01*, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, *JP 3-26,* Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security; *JP 3-07.6,* Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, *and JP 3-26.2*, Joint Doctrine for Civil Support.[263]

4. Unique Considerations

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center."

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF

a. **Interagency Coordination**. There is an increased need for the military to work with other agencies of the USG as well as other nations' governments in planning and conducting security cooperation and deterrence operations and activities. Consensus building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency's capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal — to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission — can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.[264]

b. **Information Collection**. NGOs and international organizations, by the very nature of what they do, become familiar with the culture, language, and sensitivities of a populace. This information is very valuable to military commanders as they seek to accomplish missions that focus not on destroying an enemy, but on providing aid and assistance to the populace of a foreign country. However, these organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence. They may perceive that US forces are seeking to recruit members of their organizations for collection efforts, or turn the organizations into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. By using the term "information collection," military forces may be able to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge. [265]

c. **Logistics**

(1) Logistic forces may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Logistic forces also may have continuing responsibility after the departure of combat forces in support of multinational forces, OGAs, international organizations, or NGOs. In such cases, they must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreements and ACSAs to which the US is a party. Logistic personnel also must be familiar with and adhere to any legal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US involvement in the operation. The JFC must be alert for potential legal problems arising from the unique, difficult circumstances and the highly political nature of operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian

assistance. Logistic units, like all other units, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.

(2) Logistic planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to supplement the logistic support required by US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the HN economy. Accordingly, early mission analysis must consider distribution requirements. Airfields, ports, and road networks must be assessed, particularly those in underdeveloped countries where status will be in question. Delay in completing the assessment directly impacts the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support forces may be required to build or improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate follow-on force closure as well as the delivery of humanitarian cargo. Procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield slot times with other participants in the operation. Availability of fuel and other key support items may impinge on transportation support.

(3) JFCs need to plan for the early acquisition of real estate and facilities for force and logistic bases where temporary occupancy is planned and/or inadequate or no property is provided by the HN. Early negotiation for real property can be critical to the successful flow of forces. Funding for real property comes from operations and maintenance funds.[266]

For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

d. **HSS**. In addition to providing conventional HSS to deployed forces, HSS resources may be used in operations such as FHA and disaster relief to further US national goals and objectives. Based on the very humanitarian nature of HSS activities, assistance from HSS forces may be more readily accepted by the civilian populace.[267]

(1) **Medical threat information** must be obtained prior to deployment and frequently updated once forces are deployed. US forces may be placed at risk in security

cooperation and deterrence scenarios as the incidence and exposure to infectious diseases is greater in manmade and natural disaster areas and in developing nations. Further, environmental injuries and diseases, field hygiene and sanitation, and other preventive medicine concerns have the potential for greater impact on operations since the forces employed are often small independent units with limited personnel. Consequently, occurrences of disease and injuries can quickly affect combat effectiveness and may adversely affect the success of a mission. [268]

(2) The **early introduction of preventive medicine personnel** or units into theater facilitates the protection of US forces from diseases and injuries. It also permits a thorough assessment of the medical threat to and operational requirements of the mission. Preventive medicine support to US and multinational forces, HN civilians, refugees, and displaced persons includes education and training personal hygiene and field sanitation, personal protective measures, epidemiological investigations, pest management, and inspection of water sources and supplies. HSS commanders and surgeons must be kept apprised of legal requirements in relation to operations conducted in this environment. Issues such as eligibility of beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies used and manpower expended, and provisions of legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater must be reviewed.[269]

For further guidance on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

e. **Cultural Awareness.** The social, economic, and political environments in which security cooperation activities are conducted requires a great degree of cultural understanding. Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly HN dictate a firm understanding of the HN's cultural and political realities. The capability of the HN government and leadership, as well as existing treaties and social infrastructure, are critical planning factors.

(1) Security cooperation and deterrence efforts likely will impact countries throughout a region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring states, including hostility toward the United States, may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing enemies in the area may be perceived by these enemies as upsetting the regional balance of power. These same nations may see US intervention in the area simply as US imperialism. While such factors will not dictate US policy, they will require careful evaluation and consideration when conducting military operations under those conditions.

(2) The emergence of regional actors may result in an increase in multinational efforts which may be further complicated by increased cultural and language barriers among partners and interoperability of equipment and tactics. The military planner must consider and address all these challenges when planning military operations with multinational partners.[270]

SECTION C. SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS

5. General

a. **Crisis Response**. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or a NEO. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, SSO often may be planned and executed as small-scale or complex contingencies under crisis action circumstances.

b. **Small-Scale Operations and Economy of Force**. The emerging environment requires the United States to maintain and prepare joint forces for smaller-scale contingency operations simultaneous with other operations, preferably in concert with allies and friends. This approach recognizes that such contingencies will vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of many SSO may lend themselves to using small elements like SOF in coordination with

allied HNs. Initial SOF lead of small scale contingences as an economy of force measure may enable larger-scale operations with conventional focus to progress more effectively.

Units deploying for small-scale operations must be prepared and equipped for a range of challenging tasks.

6. Types

a. **NEOs** are operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs also may include citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the Department of State is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. This order also directs the Department of Defense to advise and assist the Department of State in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of Emergency Action Plans is the responsibility of the geographic CCDR.[271]

Selected Haitian noncombatants board a US C-130 bound for safe haven camps in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER

(1) **NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty.** They may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country's government, reoriented political or military relations with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster.

(2) NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

(3) NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves **swift insertion** of a force, **temporary occupation** of objectives, and ends with a **planned withdrawal**. It differs from a raid in that **force used normally is limited** to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees.[272]

OPERATION EASTERN EXIT

On 1 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu's international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy's only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

Operation EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from 30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in the midst of the Gulf War.

VARIOUS SOURCES[273]

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.[274]

b. **Peace Operations**

"Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do."

Dag Hammarskjold

(1) PO are military operations that support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. For the Armed Forces of the United States, **PO encompass** peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Operations in support of diplomatic efforts include preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building (discussed below). PO (i.e., PKO and PEO) are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.[275]

(a) **PKO are military operations** undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, **designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement** (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982.[276]

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Beginning in December 1995, US and allied nations deployed peacekeeping forces to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Task Force EAGLE, comprised of 20,000 American soldiers, is implementing the military elements of the Dayton Peace Accords. This operation marked the first commitment of forces in NATO's history as well as the first time since World War II that American and Russian soldiers have shared a common mission. Today, thousands of people are alive in Bosnia because of these soldiers' service.

During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, deployed intelligence personnel provided aircrews and staffs at several locations with critical threat information and airfield data. Taking advantage of the Combat Intelligence System (CIS) capabilities and an emerging global connectivity to military networks and databases, intelligence personnel provided the best and most timely support ever to air mobility forces. This improvement was particularly evident during the Mission Report (MISREP) process, when intelligence analysts used CIS to provide MISREP data very quickly to aircrews and staffs, ensuring the people in need of this intelligence received it while the data was still useful.

The European Command's ARG/MEU(SOC) was assigned as theater reserve for NATO forces, while Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 133 and 40 constructed base camps for implementation force personnel. In addition, from June to October a Marine Corps unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron, VMU-1, supported the operation with Pioneer UAV imagery both to U.S. and multinational units. VMU-2 continues to provide similar support.

VARIOUS SOURCES[277]

(b) **PEO** are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. **PEO are stability operations that may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute**. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE, 1995-2001 in Bosnia and JOINT GUARDIAN, 1999-2001 in Kosovo are examples of PEO.[278]

Joint forces support peace enforcement operations to compel compliance with measures designed to establish an environment for truce or cease-fire.[279]

(2) **Relationship of PO to Diplomatic Activities**. US military PO support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic activities:

UN equipment is loaded on a C-5 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bound for Kigali, Rwanda, during Operation SUPPORT HOPE peace operations.[280]

(a) **Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive diplomacy consists of **diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis** to prevent or limit violence. Military support to preventive diplomacy may include shows of force such as preventive deployments or increasing levels of readiness. The objective of preventive diplomacy is to demonstrate commitment to a peaceful resolution while underlining the willingness to use a ready and capable military force if necessary. Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US Forces deployed in 1993 to Macedonia in support of the UN effort to limit the fighting in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is an example of preventive diplomacy.

(b) **Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that **arranges an end to a dispute, and/or resolves issues** that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, and information operations. The concept is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative to fighting. The military can assist in establishing incentives, disincentives, and mechanisms that promote reconciliation. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military exchanges and security assistance.

Joint forces are often deployed in support of the United Nations in multinational peace operations.[281]

(c) **Peace Building**. Peace building consists of postconflict actions, predominantly diplomatic, economic, and security related that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. **Military support to peace building are stability operations that may include rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.**[282]

OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF AND RESTORE HOPE

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the complexity of integrating peace operations with other types of operations and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somalis (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continued to suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States was the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directed the Commander, US Central Command (USCINCCENT) to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On 3 December the President directed USCINCCENT to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national institutions and its hope for

the future. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as other nations. On 9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US special operations forces and amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishu and into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, control was pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air bases were secured. Over the next 3 months, the coalition expanded into the southern half of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supply convoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instability in the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the US Department of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief organizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which relief operations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper were established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, as well as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.

VARIOUS SOURCES[283]

For additional guidance on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.[284]

c. **Recovery Operations** may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning in order to execute. Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on whether the operational environment is hostile, uncertain, or permissive.[285]

(1) **PR focuses on the live recovery of isolated personnel**. PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile environments. As one of its highest priorities, the Department of Defense has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent their exploitation by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States. There are five PR tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate) necessary to achieve a complete and coordinated recovery of DOD personnel, civilian employees, and certain contractor personnel.

(2) **Remains Recovery**, on the other hand, is an operation concerned with recovering, identifying, and repatriating the remains of individuals. Operation FULL ACCOUNTING conducted to account for and recover the remains of Service members lost during the Vietnam War is an example of this type of recovery operation.[286]

d. **Strikes And Raids**[287]

(1) **Strikes** are offensive operations conducted to damage, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes**.** Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. Operation URGENT FURY, conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983, was a strike.

"The Joint Staff concluded that the rewards of a successful operation offset the risks. A swift, precise strike probably would rescue most of the students and avert a hostage situation. Removal of the pro-Cuban junta would eliminate a threat to US strategic interests in the Caribbean. A well-executed display of US military prowess would convey US determination to protect its vital interests."

Operation URGENT FURY
Ronald H. Cole
Joint History Office[288]

(2) **Raids** involve swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy an objective. Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. An example of a raid is Operation EL DORADO

CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin.

Operation EL DORADO CANYON

The raid was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi's ability to export terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would provide him "incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior." The final targets of the raid were selected at the National Security Council level "within the circle of the President's advisors." Ultimately, five targets were selected: All except one of the targets were chosen because of their direct connection to terrorist activity. The single exception was the Benina military airfield which based Libyan fighter aircraft. This target was hit to preempt Libyan interceptors from taking off and attacking the incoming US bombers.

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less than 12 minutes, and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Navy A-6 Intruders were assigned the target in the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched. One FB-111 strike aircraft was lost during the strike. The entire armada remained in the vicinity for over an hour trying to account for all aircraft.

VARIOUS SOURCES

7. Unique Considerations

a. **Duration and End State**. SSO may last for a relatively **short period of time** (e.g., NEO, strike, raid) or for an **extended period of time** to achieve the desired end state. For example, the United States has been a partner with ten other nations in the independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula since 1982. **Short duration operations are not always possible**, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve objectives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a clear desired end state for all types of SSO.

b. **Intelligence and Information Collection**. SSO are significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information collection. As soon as practical after an operation is declared, JFCs and planners determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of intelligence publications, and the

possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some SSO (such as peacekeeping), the term "information collection" is used rather than the term "intelligence" because of the sensitivity of the operation.[289]

(1) **HUMINT** may often provide the most useful source of information. If a HUMINT infrastructure is not in place when US forces arrive, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT also supplements other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in a town square, it cannot gauge the motivations or enthusiasm of the crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas, belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, thereby denying US forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. **HUMINT is essential to supplement signals intelligence and overhead imagery,** to produce the most accurate intelligence products.[290]

(2) Where there is little USG or US military presence, **open-source intelligence (OSINT)** may be the best immediately available information to prepare US forces to operate in a foreign country. OSINT from radio broadcasts, newspapers, and periodicals often provide tip-offs for HUMINT collection.[291]

(3) **Intelligence collection** requires a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. This requires a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment's peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. In addition, intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the operational area, to include capabilities and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface LOCs.[292]

(4) Intelligence organizations (principally at the JTF headquarters level) should include **foreign area officers**. They add valuable cultural awareness to the production of useable intelligence.[293]

c. **Constraints and Restraints**. A JFC tasked with conducting SSO may face numerous restrictions in addition to the normal restrictions associated with ROE. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely important, not only because military forces may be used to support international sanctions, but also because of the probability of involvement by international organizations. As a consequence, legal rights of individuals and organizations and funding of the operation should be addressed by the CCDR's staff. Also, constraints and restraints imposed on any agency or organization involved in the operation should be understood by other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.[294]

d. **Education and Training**. The Armed Forces of the United States may be directed to conduct SSO with very little notice. Further, for some SSO (e.g., NEO, PO) warfighting skills are not always appropriate. To be effective in these types of situations, a mindset other than warfighting is required. Readying forces to successfully cope in these conditions requires a two-pronged approach — education and training. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency coordination with special emphasize on the importance ROE, use of force, and nonlethal weapons should be developed and implemented for individuals and units. Personnel from other USG agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations should be invited to participate in these programs.[295]

"A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force."

LTG T. Montgomery, USA
Senior Military Representative to NATO

(1) **Professional military education** of all officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the most senior levels. The focus is to ensure leaders at all levels understand the objectives, principles, and characteristics of SSO and can plan and conduct these operations. Leader education will include discussions, lessons learned, and situational exercises, and should culminate with senior leaders performing in a command or staff position during an exercise.

(2) The focus of SSO **training** is to ensure that individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given operations, and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation. Depending on the anticipated operation, predeployment training could include individual skill training, situational training exercises, field training exercises, combined arms live fire exercises, mobility exercises, command post exercises, and simulation exercises to train commanders, staffs, and components. If there is sufficient time prior to actual deployment for an operation, units should culminate their predeployment training in a joint training exercise based on the anticipated operation. The unit tasked for the operation should participate in the exercise with the supporting units with which it normally deploys, and if possible, with the next higher headquarters for the actual operation. Once deployed, and if the situation allows, military skills training at individual and unit level may occur.[296]

(3) Participation in and/or the operational environment of certain types of SSO may preclude normal mission-related training. For example, infantry units or fighter squadrons conducting certain protracted PO may not have the time, facilities, or environment in which to maintain individual or unit proficiency for traditional missions. Commanders should develop programs that enable their forces to maintain their combat skills to the maximum extent possible.[297]

CHAPTER VI
SUPPORT TO HOMELAND SECURITY[298]

"Everyone knows that the Pentagon is not in the business of providing an armed force for the United States, but when an event occurs we get the phone call and why do we get the phone call? Well, because the Department of Defense is considered the Department of Defense. They know that they've got troops. They've got people who respond. They're organized and they can be of assistance."

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
July 2002

1. Homeland Security

a. The homeland is the physical region that includes CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories and possessions, and the surrounding territorial waters and airspace. To preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, the Nation must have a homeland that is secure from adversary threats and violence, including terrorism.

b. As part of an integrated national strategy, military power is applied in concert with the other instruments of national power to maintain a secure homeland. The diversity of challenges requires that the military instrument of national power assume a broader role in detecting and preventing threats or acts of terrorism. Given the persistent, complex nature of our contemporary security environment, a proactive, comprehensive approach to HS is necessary.

2. National Strategy for Homeland Security

a. HS is the Nation's first priority, and is a national effort. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) complements the NSS by providing a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local and private organizations. The Department of Defense has a key role in that effort. To support the NSHS, the Armed Forces, in accordance with guidance established in the NMS, conducts planning and operations to protect, prevent, and prevail against threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests, and to mitigate the impact of adversary actions.

b. The NSHS strategic objectives include preventing terrorist attacks within US territory, reducing America's vulnerabilities to terrorism, and minimizing damage and recovering from attacks. To ensure the security of the homeland, a number of critical areas require increased emphasis as follows.

(1) Intelligence and warning.

(2) Border and transportation security.

(3) Domestic counterterrorism.

(4) Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets.

(5) Defending against catastrophic threats.

(6) Emergency preparedness and response.

3. Department of Defense Homeland Security Responsibilities

a. DOD's HS responsibilities are global in nature and are conducted in depth, focusing on the threat source across a geographical spectrum that includes forward regions, approaches, and the homeland. The divisions among the three regions are not absolute and may overlap or shift depending on the situation and threat. **Within the homeland, the Department of Defense contributes to the NSHS through the HD and CS mission areas**. HD is the protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. The Department of Defense is the LFA for HD. DOD's role in the CS mission area consists of support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies and designated law enforcement activities within the scope of the restraints mandated by Posse Comitatus. DOD's primary roles include reducing the threat of terrorist attacks against the United States; protecting territorial sovereignty, domestic population and defense critical

infrastructure; supporting civilian authorities; and ensuring that emergency preparedness resources and procedures are in place.

b. To ensure DOD's readiness for HD and CS mission areas, the Department of Defense must also engage in emergency preparedness (EP) planning activities. These are undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and Secretary of Defense, and as required, other federal departments and agencies during a designated national security emergency.

4. Key Participants, Roles, and Responsibilities

a. The President and the Secretary of Defense define the circumstances under which the Department of Defense becomes involved in HD and CS. Authority and control of the Armed Forces of the United States during such operations is exercised through the chain of command described in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* and by DOD policy. Regardless of whether the Department of Defense is conducting HD or CS activities, military forces always remain under the control of the established title 10, 32, USC, and/or State active duty military chain of command.

(1) The Secretary of Defense has overall authority for the Department of Defense and is the President's principal advisor on concerning DOD support to HS. Authority for the conduct and execution of HD missions resides with the Secretary of Defense. Also, the Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and equipment and retains control of assigned title 10, USC, military forces while operating in a CS role.

(2) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) is responsible for coordinating all HD and CS matters with other executive departments and federal agencies.

(3) Commander, USNORTHCOM, and Commander, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), are the two principal CCDRs tasked with specific HD and CS

responsibilities. Within the designated AORs, Commander, USNORTHCOM, and Commander, USPACOM, are the supported commanders for the HD mission area and the principal DOD planning agents for CS mission areas.

(4) The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the LFA responsible for the coordination and conduct of maritime security operations carried out under civil authorities for HS in the US maritime domain. In its maritime law enforcement role, the USCG has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas and is the only military service not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act.

b. For HD missions, the Department of Defense is in the LFA with other federal agencies in support. During CS operations the Department of Defense serves in a supporting role to other agencies by providing military support to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local levels. See Figure VI-1.

5. The DOD Homeland Security Operational Framework

a. **General**. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, fall into two mission areas — HD and CS. These mission areas contain a number of unique (and many times overlapping) missions as depicted in Figure VI-2.



Figure VI-1. Lead Federal Agency/Department of Defense Relationships

b. **Homeland Defense Missions**

(1) Within the HD mission area, there are air, land, and maritime missions. Although these missions are described in the context of defense, HD missions include offensive actions (preemptive activities to deter, disrupt, and destroy adversary capabilities at their source).

(a) Air missions include measures taken to deter, detect, defeat, or nullify hostile air threats against the US homeland, domestic population and infrastructure. Air missions are directed at attacking enemy aircraft and missiles.

(b) Land missions include measures taken to deter, and if necessary, defeat land threats. When directed by the President, ground forces may be employed to conduct offensive operations and establish active and passive defenses in depth to counter conventional and asymmetric threats.



Figure VI-2. Homeland Security Operational Framework

(c) Maritime missions involve measures taken to deter, detect, defeat, or nullify maritime threats against the homeland and its domestic population and infrastructure. When directed by the President, maritime forces may conduct offensive operations and active and passive defenses in depth to counter maritime attacks.

(2) HD supporting operations and enabling activities include critical infrastructure protection, space operations, force protection and antiterrorism activities, ballistic missile defense, and IO. HD supporting operations and activities often overlap with one another and specific tasks may be closely related.

c. **Civil Support Missions**. Employment of military forces within the United States, its territories, and possessions typically falls under the broad mission of MACA. MACA operations consist of three subordinate missions; military assistance for civil disturbance (or MACDIS), military support to civil authorities (or MSCA), and military support to civil law enforcement agencies (or MSCLEA). Military activities associated with the CS mission area include, but are not limited to, domestic CBRNE crisis management and CM; counterdrug operations; maritime security; national special security events; disaster responses; border security; antiterrorism; intelligence sharing; emergency preparedness; and IO. The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for the use of DOD assets for CS.

For detailed doctrinal guidance on homeland defense and civil support, see JP 3-26.1, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Defense, *and JP 3-26.2,* Joint Doctrine for Civil Support.

For additional information on HS, refer to JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President's executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As part of those operations, the Commander, Forces Command, directed the Second US Army to form Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.

JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate relief provided life support systems — food, water, shelter, medical supplies and services, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensured sustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, state, and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitution phase continued to reestablish services under Federal, state, and local control, while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tons of mission support materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by sea and over land. Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000 patients received medical treatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected. A mobile radio station was established to provide emergency information to the local population and to provide route information to assist convoys as they arrived. Four life support centers were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for approximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed, and 98 schools were repaired.

JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.

This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces of the United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation.

VARIOUS SOURCES[299]

APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

b. The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support accomplishment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

c. Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. **The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political goals that necessitate a change in the military objectives**. The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, attainment of the military objectives may no longer support the political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.[300]

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

4. Economy of Force

a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting

successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

c. At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.[301]

(1) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.[302]

(2) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by the Commander, US Central Command's concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them. The objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.[303]

(3) Once forces are deployed into the operational area, maneuver typically is considered tactical in nature.[304]

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.

Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.

10. Restraint

a. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the desired end state. An example would be the exposure of intelligence gathering activities (i.e., interrogation of detainees and prisoners of war) that could have significant political and military repercussions and therefore should be conducted with sound judgment. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.[305]

b. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel are properly trained, i.e., know and understand ROE and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and/or national embarrassment. ROE in some operations may be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than during combat, consistent always with the inherent right of self-defense. ROE should be unclassified, if possible, and widely disseminated. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in joint operations are not needlessly endangered. In multinational operations, use of force may be dictated by coalition or allied force ROE. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to

ensure an understanding of ROE and how to influence changes to them. Since the domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive concerning the use of force than permitted under coalition or allied force ROE, commanders must be aware of national restrictions imposed on force participants.[306]

11. Perseverance

a. Prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the desired end state.

b. Some joint operations may require years to achieve the termination criteria. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.[307]

12. Legitimacy[308]

a. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken as well as the will of the US public to support the actions. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to achieve the desired end state. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The perception of legitimacy by the US public is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly placed at risk. Other interested audiences may include the foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces. IO should be used prudently to enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.

b. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns. All actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic and tactical requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the

international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce it.

c. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and civil military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate. During operations in an area where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.

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APPENDIX B
THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

1. General

The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to provide substance to the basic framework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. **Mission Analysis**

(1) Determine the higher command's purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Termination criteria should include the military strategic and/or operational objectives that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought.

(2) Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. If multiple, determine priorities.

b. **Mission Statement**

(1) Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).

(2) Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses of Action

a. **Situation Analysis**

(1) **Geostrategic Context**

(a) **Domestic and international context**: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; and international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

(b) **Characteristics of the operational area**: military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather); transportation; telecommunications; economics (organization, industrial base, and mobilization capacity); social conditions; and science and technology factors affecting the operational area.

(2) **Analysis of the Adversary**. Scrutiny of the opponent situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders normally will have available a formal intelligence estimate) should include the following.

(a) Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.

(b) Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).

(c) Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.

(d) Possible external military support.

(e) COGs (strategic and operational).

(f) Specific operational characteristics, including strength, composition, location, and disposition; reinforcements; logistics; time, and space factors (including basing utilized and available); and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations).

(3) **Friendly Situation**. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the adversary. At the theater level, commanders normally will have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and BCS estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

(4) **Restrictions**. Those limitations to the use or threat of use of force that are imposed or necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

(5) **Assumptions**. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors upon which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

(6) **Deductions**. Deductions from the above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. **Courses of Action Analysis**. COAs development are based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following.

(1) Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

(2) Forces required.

(3) BCS concept.

(4) Logistic concept.

(5) Deployment concept.

(6) Estimate of time required to reach termination criteria.

(7) Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

4. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities

a. Determine the probable effect of possible adversary capabilities on the success of each friendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

c. Consider conflict termination issues; think through own action, opponent reaction, and counterreaction.

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; and list advantages and disadvantages of each adversary capability.

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governing factors.

(1) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of joint operations, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art).

(2) Other critical factors (for example, political constraints).

(3) Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: when, where, how, and why.

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APPENDIX C
JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0 SERIES HIERARCHY

TO BE DEVELOPED DURING FINAL COORDINATION

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APPENDIX D
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary references.

1. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 161 et. seq. PL 99-433).

2. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.

3. *Draft National Military Strategy*, 4 February 2004.

4. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.

5. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.

6. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

7. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

8. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

9. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.

10. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.

11. JP 3-26, *Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security*.

12. JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*.

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APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces command and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JEDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

Army:	US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181
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Navy:	CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099
Marine Corps:	Commander (Attn: Publications) 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321
Coast Guard:	Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001
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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
~~ADCON~~	~~administrative control~~
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
BCS	battlespace communications system
BDA	battle damage assessment
C2	command and control
~~C3~~	~~command, control, and communications~~
~~C3IC~~	~~coalition coordination, communications, and integration center~~
~~C4~~	~~command, control, communications, and computers~~
~~C4I~~	~~command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence~~
CA	civil affairs
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CID	combat identification
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CM	consequence management
CMO	civil-military operations
CNA	computer network attack
CND	computer network defense
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)

COG	center of gravity
COMMZ	communications zone
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
CS	civil support
~~DIRLAUTH~~	~~direct liaison authorized~~
DOD	Department of Defense
~~DSO~~	~~domestic support operations~~
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EW	electronic warfare
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
~~FSCL~~	~~fire support coordination line~~
GS	global strike
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HRP	high-risk personnel
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPE	individual protective equipment
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff

JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
~~JFLCC~~	~~joint force land component commander~~
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIPB	joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JRA	joint rear area
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSST	joint space support team
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JUO	joint urban operations
KM	knowledge management
LFA	lead Federal Agency
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOC	line of communications
MCO	major combat operations
MILDEC	military deception
~~MOOTW~~	~~military operations other than war~~
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
~~NCA~~	~~National Command Authorities~~
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization

NMS	national military strategy
~~NORAD~~	~~North American Aerospace Defense Command~~
NSS	national security strategy
~~OFDA~~	~~Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance~~
OGA	other government agency
ONA	operational net assessment
OPCON	operational control
~~OPLAN~~	~~operation plan~~
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PEO	peace enforcement operations
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PO	peace operations
PR	personnel recovery
PSYOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
ROE	rules of engagement
SIO	special information operations
SJFHQ (CE)	standing joint force headquarters (core element)
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standing operating procedure
SSO	small-scale operations
TACON	tactical control
~~TEP~~TSCP	theater ~~engagement~~security cooperation plan
TST	time-sensitive target

UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
~~USSPACECOM~~	~~United States Space Command~~
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. Also called air apportionment. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage

assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

battlespace communications system. An agile, shared and trusted infrastructure of communications networks and common information services that enable joint and multinational warfighting capabilities. It provides the means to execute command and control and enhances information sharing, collaboration, and situational awareness resulting in information and decision superiority. The battlespace communications system is built upon the policy, doctrine, organizational structures, training, personnel, equipment, and procedures designed to support the full range of military operations. It provides the interface to multinational, interagency, and nongovernmental users and information services. The battlespace communications system describes the contributions individual units, agencies or organizations make to the overall DOD Global Information Grid. Also called BCS. (This term replaces the term "command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems." (Upon approval of JP 6-0, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02)

boundary. A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 1-02)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An

arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after ~~the National Command Authorities select the~~a course of action is selected during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be modified and included in JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. (JP 1-02)

~~combat~~**campaign assessment.** The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of ~~three~~four major components, (a) effects assessment, (b) battle damage assessment, (~~b~~c) munitions effects assessment, and (~~c~~d) reattack recommendations. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. ~~The J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force J-2.~~ Also called **CA**. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be modified and included in JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called **C2**. (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirements. A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely

information management and the decision making ~~process that affect successful mission accomplishment~~. The ~~two~~ key subcomponents are ~~critical friendly force information and~~ priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirement, and essential elements of friendly information. Also called **CCIR**. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be modified and included in JP 1-02)

commander's estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate, which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)

common operational picture. A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

communications zone. Rear part of theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations.

The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept or **CONOPS**. (JP 1-02)

conflict. ~~An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force~~An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02~~.~~)

consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called **CM**. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same

Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

coup de main. An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

critical capabilities. Those adversary capabilities that are considered crucial enablers for the adversary's center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s). (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02) [309]

critical requirements. Those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02) [310]

critical vulnerabilities. Those aspects or components of the adversary's critical capabilities (or components thereof), which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resources applied. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02) [311]

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

deployable joint task force augmentation cell. A combatant commander (~~CINC~~CCDR) asset composed of personnel from the ~~CINC's staff~~combatant command and component~~s'~~ ~~representatives~~staffs. The members represent a ~~multi-service~~joint, multi-disciplined group of planners and operators which operationally report to the ~~CINC~~CCDR's Operations Directorate until deployed to a joint task force (JTF). It can be tailored to meet the needs of a commander, ~~joint task force~~JTF and deploy within 48 hours from notification. Members can also act as liaison officers between the ~~CINC~~CCDR and the JTF. Also called **DJTFAC**. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be modified and included in JP 1-02)

desired end state. What the President of the United States wants the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic situation to be, stated in terms of national strategic objectives, when a military campaign or operation concludes. Also called the national strategic end state. (Upon approval of this publication revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also

called **EW**. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called **EA**. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called **EP**. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called **ES**. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

enemy capabilities. Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. "Enemy capabilities" are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a

nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives throughout the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

environmental considerations. The spectrum of environmental media, resources, or programs that may impact on, or are affected by, the planning and execution of military operations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, environmental compliance, pollution prevention, conservation, protection of historical and cultural sites, and protection of flora and fauna. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

essential elements of friendly information. Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. (JP 1-02)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordinating measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

~~**fire support coordination line.** A fire support coordinating measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based~~

~~weapons systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)~~

force projection. The ability to project the military element of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and definition will modify the existing term and definition and will be included in~~ JP 1-02~~.~~)

friendly force information requirements. Information the commander and staff need about the forces, capabilities, and sustainment available for the operation. (Upon

approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

global strike. Integrated strike planning and command and control support to deliver rapid, extended range, precision lethal (including nuclear) and nonlethal effects in support of theater and national objectives. Global strike may be used independently or as part of a joint operation to attack the complete range of targets. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)[312]

information operations. ~~Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems~~The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. (~~JP 1-02~~This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-13.)

information superiority. ~~The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same~~That degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition. (JP 1-02)

integration. 1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the

time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (JP 1-02)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02~~.~~)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFACC**. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFLCC**. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFMCC**. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFSOCC**. (~~This term and its definition~~

~~modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. Also called **JIPB**. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called **JOA**. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. ~~The scope and duration of the special~~

~~operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area.~~ It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called **JSOA**. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will modified the existing term and its definition and included in JP 1-02)

joint strategic attack. A joint strategic attack is a combatant commander directed offensive action against a vital target(s), whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected in order to achieve National Command Authorities or combatant commander's strategic objectives. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-70.)

Joint Strategic Planning System. The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. (JP 1-02)

joint urban operations. All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. Also called **JUO**. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

lines of operations. Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (JP 1-02)

major combat operations. Large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s) that possesses significant regional military capability and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US national security. Also called **MCO**. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

major operation. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the battlespace through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are:

a. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in

support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. Also called **MILDEC**. (JP 1-02)

military end state. The set of required ~~conditions~~objectives, conditions, and termination criteria that defines achievement of the commander's ~~objectives~~mission. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW.~~ (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02)

military strategic objective. A theater-level military goal that, when accomplished, directly contributes to attainment of a national strategic objective(s). Reaching it requires the application of operational art. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**mission type order.** 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02)~~

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

national military strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (JP 1-02)

national security strategy. The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. (JP 1-02)

national strategic objective. A national goal that requires the employment of all instruments of national power to accomplish. It describes, in broad terms, a US political aim. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal~~s~~ towards which ~~every~~ military operation~~s~~ ~~should be~~are directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and~~

~~are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (JP 1-02)

operational authority. That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military

operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

operational objective. An intermediate goal that, when accomplished, directly contributes to the attainment of a military strategic and/or national strategic objective(s). Reaching this goal requires the application of operational art. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

operational protection. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given theater of operations. Operational protection is also stated as protecting the operational mission.

(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called **OPSEC**. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called **PO**. (JP 1-02)

physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 1-02)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02)

risk management. The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called **RM**. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

security cooperation activities. All military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Security cooperation activities are designed to support a combatant commander's theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)[313]

sequel. A major operation that follows the current major operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,

organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

small-scale operations. Joint operations that are limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve specific operational or strategic objectives in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex campaign or operation. Small-scale operations are executed in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Also called **SSO**. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO**. (JP 1-02)

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing specific types of developmental, cooperative, or coercive security cooperation and deterrence activities, small-scale operations, and/or missions that promote local or regional normalcy and protect US interests abroad. Stability operations may be conducted in all operational environments and during all phases of a campaign or major operation. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

strategic estimate. The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02~~.~~)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ JP 1-02.)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the

intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called **TACON**. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02)

terms of reference. Terms of reference allude to a mutual agreement under which a command, element, or unit exercises authority or undertake specific missions or tasks relative to another command, element, or unit. Also called **TORs**. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

theater of operations. A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (JP 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the ~~National Command Authorities~~President, Secretary of Defense, or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02)

theater strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (JP 1-02)

unified action. A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

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1

ENDNOTES

[1] USJFCOM #85.
[2] USJFCOM #85.
[3] USJFCOM #85.
[4] USJFCOM #85.
[5] USJFCOM #85
[6] USJFCOM #85, then modified.
[7] Section moved from Chapter I, para 4e, then edited.
[8] Moved from Chapter I, para 4a, then edited.
[9] Developed from the NSS.
[10] Moved from Chapter I, para 4c, then edited.
[11] Moved from Chapter I, para 4c, then edited.
[12] Moved from Chapter I, para 4d, then edited.
[13] New material on global operations from JADD.
[14] New material on global operations from JADD.
[15] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5f(1), then edited.
[16] Moved from Chapter I, para 5f(4), then edited.
[17] Moved from Chapter I, para 5f(5).
[18] Moved from Chapter I, para 5a and 5f(2), then edited.
[19] Moved from Chapter I, para 4b, then edited.
[20] Moved from Chapter I, para 4a, then edited.
[21] Moved from Chapter I, para 6d.
[22] Moved from Chapter I, para 5b(1), then edited.
[23] Moved from Chapter I, para 5b(2)(3), then edited.
[24] Moved from Chapter I, para 3e(2), then edited.
[25] New material provided by JADD TRADOC.
[26] Subparagraphs (2) through (4) were moved to Chapter III under operational art.
[27] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5b(3), then edited.
[28] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter II, para 2b; then edited.
[29] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5c, then edited.
[30] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 1e, then edited.
[31] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5c.
[32] Moved from para 1b(2), then edited.
[33] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4a(3), then edited.
[34] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 3b.
[35] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 3e(1) through 3e(3) and last sentence from 2b(6).
[36] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 2, then edited with material from VI, paras 3c(2) and 3g(2).
[37] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4e(2).
[38] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4e(3)(a), then edited.
[39] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4e(3)(b), then edited.
[40] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4e(3)(c), then edited.
[41] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4e(4)(a).
[42] Sentence moved from Chapter VI, para 3c(2), then edited.
[43] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 4e(4)(b) through (d), then edited.

[44] New material from USJFCOM #445.
[45] New material from USJFCOM #407.
[46] Sentence taken from old Chapter VI, para 3c(2), then edited.
[47] Moved from old Chapter VI, paras 4f(2) and (3).
[48] Moved from old Chapter VI, paras 4g(1) and (2), then edited.
[49] Moved from old Chapter VI, para 3f(2), then edited.
[50] Moved from old Chapter VI.
[51] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5d(5).
[52] Moved from Chapter I, para 5d(1), then edited.
[53] Moved from Chapter I, para 5d(4), then edited.
[54] Previous three sentences moved from Chapter I, para 5d(1).
[55] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5d(2).
[56] Section moved from Chapter I, para 5d(2).
[57] New material from USJFCOM #407.
[58] New material from USJFCOM CIB.
[59] JP 3-07, revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2p, then edited.
[60] Moved from Chapter I, end of para 5d.
[61] Sentence inserted from para 5a(3).
[62] Moved from para 5e(2) above, then edited.
[63] Moved from para 5e(4) above, then edited with material from JP 3-31, para 2b(3).
[64] Moved from para 5e(4)(a) above.
[65] Moved from para 5e(4)(b) above.
[66] Moved from para 5e(4) above, then edited with material from JP 3-31, para 2b(3)
[67] New material from JADD TRADOC.
[68] Sentence moved up from old para 7d.
[69] Moved from Chapter II, para 7a, then edited.
[70] New material from CIB writing assignment #24.
[71] Sentence taken from old 6a(1) above.
[72] Moved from para 6c(1) below.
[73] Moved from para 6d(1) below.
[74] Sentence moved from para 6c(2)(c) above.
[75] Moved from para 4g(4) above.
[76] Sentence moved from para 4b above.
[77] Moved from old 6d(3), then edited.
[78] New material from CIB writing assignment #20.
[79] Taken from JPs 5-00.2 and 1-02, and FD 04 trip report.
[80] Moved up from para 8b(6), then edited.
[81] New material summarized from JADD writing assignment #6 and USA doctrine.
[82] Sentence moved from old Chapter IV, para 1b, then edited.
[83] New material summarized from JADD writing assignment #6, then edited.
[84] Moved from Chapter II, para 2c(2), then edited.
[85] Moved from Chapter II, para 2c(3), then edited.
[86] Para and subparas moved from Chapter II, para 2c(4), then edited.
[87] New material from USJFCOM #76.
[88] New material from JADD writing assignment #5.

[89] Moved from i(3)(a) below per USJFCOM #432, then edited.
[90] USJFCOM CRA for consistency with JP 5-00.1.
[91] USJFCOM CRA.
[92] Sentence moved from (6).
[93] Moved from Chapter I, para 7a, then edited.
[94] Moved from para 4a(1) and (2) above, then edited.
[95] Sentence moved from para 4a(7) above, then edited.
[96] Moved from para 4a(1), then edited.
[97] Moved from para 4b(1) above.
[98] Sentence moved from para 4b(2) above.
[99] Moved from para 4 above.
[100] Moved from para 4b(2) above, then edited.
[101] Moved from para 4a(3) above, then edited.
[102] Sentence moved from para 4a(8) above, then edited.
[103] Sentence moved from para 4a(8) above, then edited.
[104] Sentence moved from 4a(7) above, then edited.
[105] Moved from para 4a(5) above, then edited.
[106] Moved from para 4a(4) above, then edited.
[107] Moved from para 4a(6) above, then edited.
[108] Moved from para 4c above, then edited.
[109] Moved from para 4c(1) above, then edited.
[110] Moved from para 5c(2)(a) and (b), then edited.
[111] Moved from para 4b above.
[112] New paragraph with subparagraphs moved from “arranging operations” above, then edited.
[113] New material from JADD, TRADOC, then edited.
[114] Sentence moved from Chapter I, para 5b(3).
[115] Moved from old Chapter IV, paragraph 3f(6).
[116] Section moved from para 6k, then edited.
[117] Moved from para 6d above, then edited.
[118] JP 3-07 revision author’s draft, Chapter IV, para 2f, then edited.
[119] New material from DOD *IO Roadmap* and USA JADD.
[120] JP 3-07 revision author’s draft, Chapter IV, para 2f, then edited.
[121] Sentence moved from Chapter III, para 6 intro.
[122] Moved from Chapter III, para 6n(7)(a).
[123] Sentence moved from Chapter III, para 6 intro.
[124] Moved from Chapter III, para 6i(7), then edited.
[125] Moved from Chapter III, para 6i(6)(d), then edited.
[126] Moved from Chapter III, para 6i(6)(a), then edited.
[127] Moved from Chapter III, para 6i(6)(b)&(c), then edited.
[128] Moved from Chapter III, para 6i(8), then edited.
[129] Moved from Chapter III, para 6i(9), then edited.
[130] New material copied from JP 3-58 (RFD), 7 July 2003.
[131] Moved from Chapter III, para 6n10sb, then edited.
[132] JP 3-07, revision author’s draft, Chapter IV, para 2n, then edited.

[133] Moved from Chapter III, para 6n11sb, then edited.
[134] Both paras are new material developed by USJFCOM CRA per writers JWG results.
[135] New material developed by the author based on feedback from OIF and Gen Luck (Ret)
[136] Moved from old Chapter VI, subparas 5a and 5b, combined, then edited.
[137] JP 3-07, revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2d, then edited. Includes preceding new material on force protection planning.
[138] JP 3-07, revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2o, then edited.
[139] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2j, then edited.
[140] Moved from 6k(5), then edited.
[141] JP 3-07, revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2k, then edited.
[142] Moved from 6k(4), then edited.
[143] JP 3-07, revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2d, then edited.
[144] JP 3-07, revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2d, then edited.
[145] Moved from para 8a, then edited.
[146] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2r, then edited.
[147] Moved from (f) below.
[148] Moved from (e) below.
[149] Remainder of original para moved to other portions of JP 3-0 RFD.
[150] New material from USJFCOM #102.
[151] Moved from 1b(2), then edited.
[152] Moved from 1f, then edited by USSOCOM
[153] Sentence moved from old Chapter, para 1b, above, then edited.
[154] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2t, then edited.
[155] Last two sentences moved from new Chapter VI, para 2b(2), then edited.
[156] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c, then edited.
[157] Moved from Chapter II, para 9b, then edited.
[158] Moved from Chapter II, paras 9c and 9d.
[159] Moved from Chapter II, para 9.
[160] Moved from 4a below.
[161] Previous two sentences moved from 2b(3), then edited.
[162] Sentence moved from 2b(1) above, then edited.
[163] First sentence modified.
[164] Sentence moved from 2b (1) and (3) above, then edited—it was in both places.
[165] Section moved from 2b(2) above, then edited.
[166] Moved from Chapter III, para 6e(9)(b) and (c), then edited
[167] Previous two sentences taken from 2b(5).
[168] Sentence taken from 2b(5).
[169] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2b; then edited.
[170] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7)(a), then edited with USJFCOM #53.
[171] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7)(b), then edited with USJFCOM #54.
[172] New material from USJFCOM #54.
[173] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7)(c) and (g), then edited.
[174] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7).
[175] New material from USJFCOM #54.

[176] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7)(d), then edited.
[177] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7)(e), then edited.
[178] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3f(7)(f), then edited.
[179] Moved from para 2d, then edited.
[180] Sections moved from Chapter III para 6j.
[181] New material from various SJFHQ documents.
[182] Moved from para 4b below.
[183] Moved from para 4 below.
[184] Moved from para 4d below.
[185] Moved from para 4e below.
[186] New material from USSOCOM, edited.
[187] New material from USJFCOM #437.
[188] Edited and combined with JADD input.
[189] Edited and combined with JADD input.
[190] New material from JADD writing assignment #5.
[191] New material from JADD writing assignment #5.
[192] New material from JADD writing assignment #5.
[193] Moved from para 4c below.
[194] Moved from para 3g, then edited.
[195] Moved from old Chapter IV para 3e(3).
[196] Moved from para 3f.
[197] Moved from old Chapter IV para 3h(4).
[198] Moved up from old subpara (d).
[199] Moved from Chapter III, new subpara 5b(4)(c), then edited.
[200] Moved from para 5a, then edited.
[201] Moved from para 5d.
[202] Moved from para 5e.
[203] Moved from 5h below.
[204] Moved from para 5c below.
[205] Moved from para 5 below.
[206] Moved from para 5f below.
[207] Sentence moved from para 5g below.
[208] Moved from para 5g(1) below.
[209] Moved from para 5g(2) below.
[210] Moved from para 5 below.
[211] New material from USJFCOM Concepts Integration Branch.
[212] New material from USJFCOM Concepts Integration Branch.
[213] New material from USJFCOM Concepts Integration Branch.
[214] New material from USJFCOM Concepts Integration Branch.
[215] Sentence moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(1), then edited.
[216] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2x; then edited.
[217] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2x; then edited.
[218] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(1), then edited.
[219] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(2), then edited.
[220] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(2)(c), then edited.

[221] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c; then edited.
[222] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(2)(d), then edited.
[223] Moved from old Chapter V, para 3e, then edited.
[224] Moved from old Chapter V, para 3g(3), then edited.
[225] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(2)(b), then edited.
[226] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(2)(a), then edited.
[227] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4g(4)(e), then edited.
[228] Moved from old Chapter V, para 4h, then edited.
[229] JADD writing assignment #7, then edited.
[230] JADD writing assignment #7, then edited.
[231] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter I, para 4b, then edited.
[232] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter I, para 4a, then edited.
[233] JADD writing assignment #7, then edited.
[234] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2a, then edited.
[235] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5c, then edited.
[236] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2b 1sb, then edited.
[237] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III.
[238] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5c, then edited.
[239] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2b 2sb, then edited.
[240] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, end of para 2b, then edited.
[241] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5e, then edited.
[242] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5e(1), then edited with material from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2d 1sb.
[243] Moved from Chapter V, para 5e(2).
[244] Moved from Chapter V, para 5e(3), then edited with material from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2d 3sb.
[245] Moved from Chapter V, para 5e.
[246] Moved from Chapter V, para 5g, then edited with material from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2f.
[247] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2f.
[248] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2f.
[249] Moved from Chapter V, para 5h, then edited with text from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2g.
[250] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2h, then edited.
[251] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5i(1), then edited with JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2h 1sb.
[252] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5i(2), then edited with JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2h 2sb, then edited.
[253] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5k.
[254] Moved from old Chapter V, para 5j, then edited.
[255] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2i.
[256] New material on FHA taken from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2i, then edited.
[257] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2i, then edited to fit.
[258] Previous new material taken from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para

2m, then edited.
259 Previous new material taken from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2o, then edited.
260 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5r, then edited.
261 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5r.
262 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2r, then edited.
263 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5d, then edited.
264 Moved from old Chapter V, para 4b, then edited.
265 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c, then edited.
266 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2s, then edited.
267 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2t, then edited.
268 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c, then edited.
269 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2t, then edited.
270 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2i, then edited
271 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5l.
272 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2k; then edited.
273 Moved from old Chapter V.
274 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5l.
275 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5m, then edited.
276 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5m(1), then edited.
277 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2l.
278 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5m(2), edited with text from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2l 2db.
279 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2l.
280 Moved from old Chapter V.
281 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2l.
282 Previous new material on PO elements taken from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2l.
283 Moved from old Chapter V.
284 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5m.
285 Moved from old Chapter V, para 5o, then edited.
286 Previous new material taken from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2n; then edited.
287 Subject and subparas from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2p; then edited.
288 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter III, para 2p.
289 From Chapter V, para 4d, then edited.
290 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c; then edited.
291 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c; then edited.
292 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c; then edited.
293 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2c; then edited.
294 Moved from old Chapter V, para 4e, then edited.
295 Moved from Chapter V, para 4f(1), edited with text from JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2y.
296 JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2y; then edited.

[297] Moved from Chapter V, para 4f(2).
[298] New material from USA writing assignment #10.
[299] Moved from old Chapter V.
[300] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter II, para 2a, 4sb; then edited.
[301] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3e(5).
[302] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3e(5)(a).
[303] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3e(5)(b).
[304] Moved from old Chapter IV, para 3e(5)(c).
[305] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter II, para 2d, 1sb; then edited.
[306] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter II, para 2d; then edited.
[307] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2e; then edited.
[308] JP 3-07 revision author's draft, Chapter IV, para 2f; then edited.
[309] USJFCOM CRA.
[310] USJFCOM CRA.
[311] USJFCOM CRA.
[312] Provided by USSTRATCOM to support writing assignment #15.
[313] JADD writing assignment #7, then edited.


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